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Water is key for human survival as well as the economic and social development of all nations. 
It is, however, a scarce resource making effective water governance crucial in its efficient use 
and distribution among the various competing needs. Water governance is dependent on a 
framework of policies, legislation and institutions. Over the years, Kenya has enacted a number 
of water legislation that have led to the creation of multiple water institutions. However, 
challenges have still been experienced which have been attributed to the multiplicity of 
institutions and the lack of coordination mechanisms amongst them. This study sequentially 
examined the water regulatory and institutional framework for the water sector from 2002 to 
2017, identified gaps in the regulatory framework, and the resulting challenges in execution of 
their mandates. It used a cross-sectional and descriptive research design and is qualitative in 
nature. The study population included the water institutions with the Water Act, 2002, the Water 
Act, 2016, the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 forming other sources of data. Purposive sampling 
was used to identify key informants and snowballing used to refer the researcher to the 
appropriate/relevant staff members. Data collection was conducted by document analysis of the 
Water Act, 2002, the Water Act, 2016 and the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 and Key Informant 
Interviews (KIIs) with key officials of the water institutions. Data were transcribed, coded and 
categorized then themes, patterns and relationships elicited from the data. Data interpretation 
was done by scanning data for repetitive words and phrases and comparing the findings from 
the interviews and document analysis with the findings of literature review and discussing 
similarities and differences between them. The study found that the regulatory framework 
establishes institutions for regulation of water resources and water service provision, water 
works development and water harvesting and storage and financing of water services. Each 
institution has roles assigned to it which cater for principles of participation, accountability, and 
tariff setting. Despite this, gaps still exist in regulation of some institutions, overlaps in roles 
and lack of coordination mechanisms among the institutions and challenges in funding, 
regulation and coordination. As a result, the study proposes the inclusion of coordination 
mechanisms, clear outlining of roles, regulation of institutions involved in water works and 
envisioning of mechanisms for County Government involvement on matters that directly 
involve them in the Water Act.  
Key words: Water Regulation, Water Governance, Institutions, Water Resource Management 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
1.1 Introduction  
Water is at the core of sustainable development and is critical for socio-economic development, 
energy and food production, healthy ecosystems and for human survival (Yıldız, 2017). It serves 
as a crucial link between the society and the environment. Water is also a rights issue with the 
United Nations General Assembly having declared “safe and clean water and sanitation a human 
right essential to the full enjoyment of life and all other human rights” in 2010 through 
Resolution A/RES/64/292 (United Nations General Assembly, 2010). As the world’s population 
grows, the demand for water mounts and pressure on finite water resources intensifies 
(Population Action International, 2011). Integration across the water and water-using sectors is 
therefore essential for ensuring that limited water resources are shared effectively among many 
competing demands (United Nations, 2018).  
 
Approximately one fifth of the world’s population lives in water scarce areas while another 1.6 
billion face scarcity due to inadequate infrastructure or the inability of local institutions to ensure 
a regular supply of fresh water (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2007). Half of the world’s 
population is currently living in potentially water scarce areas at least one month per year and 
this could increase to some 4.8–5.7 billion people by 2050 (Burek, Satoh, Fischer, Kahil, 
Scherzer, Tramberend, Nava, Wada, Eisner, Florke, Hanasaki, Magnuszewski, and Wiberg, 
2016).  
 
A country is categorized as ‘water stressed’ if its annual renewable freshwater supplies are 
between 1,000 and 1,700 cubic meters per capita per annum and ‘water scarce’ if its renewable 
freshwater supplies are less than 1,000 cubic meters per capita per annum (Food and Agriculture 
Organization, 2007). Kenya’s fresh water supply stood at 692 cubic meters per capita per annum 
in 2015 and due to its rapidly rising population, it is expected to fall under the absolute water 
scarcity threshold of 500 cubic meters per capita per annum by 2030 (Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations, 2015). 
 
Social development and economic prosperity of Nations depend on the sustainable management 
of freshwater resources and ecosystems. The establishment of Sustainable Development Goal 
(SDG) 6, Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all, 
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reflects this significance at the global level (United Nations-Water , 2018). In Kenya, water and 
sanitation is a key area of focus for the government. In the country’s development blueprint, 
Vision 2030, the vision for water and sanitation under the social strategy is “to ensure that 
improved water and sanitation are available and accessible to all” (Government of Kenya, 2007).  
Effective water governance is increasingly seen as a necessary component of good water 
management and planning. (Lemoine & Patrick, 2014). The Global Water Partnership (GWP) 
defines water governance as “the range of political, social, economic and administrative systems 
that are in place to develop and manage water resources, and the delivery of water services, at 
different levels of society” (Rogers & Alan, 2003). Water governance is broadly seen as a 
framework where all stakeholders and sectors intervene along with the Government (Camkin & 
Neto, 2016).   
 
Water governance is about who gets water, when and how, and who has the right to water and 
related services, and their benefits. It includes formulation, establishment and implementation 
of water policies, legislation and institutions, and clarification of the roles and responsibilities 
of government, civil society and the private sector in relation to water resources and services. 
(UNDP-SIWI Water Governance Facility , 2016).  
 
Regulation is one of the primary tools that governments use to shape the welfare of economies 
and society. Regulation on its own does not determine the outcome of policy; institutions have 
an important role to play. Regulatory reviews have consistently highlighted the dynamic 
interplay between the various institutions involved in the regulatory and implementation 
processes and the need to devise mechanisms of cooperation that would ensure the development 
of consistent and quality regulation that meets desired objectives (Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, 2005). This “whole-of-government” approach with its 
emphasis on cooperation is particularly important for the increasingly fragmented and multi-
layered structure that makes up the water sector (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development [OECD], 2015).   
 
Trémolet and Hunt (2006) define regulation as ‘a defined set of functions that consist of ensuring 
that water and sanitation service providers comply with existing rules and quality standards and 
adapt those rules to cope with unforeseen events.’ They further identify; four regulatory models; 
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self-regulation, regulation by contract, regulation by contract with regulator (hybrid) and 
regulation by agency with licensing regime and three market structures namely municipal, 
regional and national.  
 
Statutory law regulates access to and use of water resources (Ogendi & Ong’oa, 2009). The 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Stockholm International Water Institute 
(SIWI) and Water Governance Facility (2016) notes that the establishment of “well-defined and 
coherent roles and responsibilities” can pave the way toward socioeconomic and environmental 
benefits, including better access to water by groups deprived of formal or informal water rights 
in the past. It also points out that “insecurity of water rights, discrepancies between formal 
legislation and informal customary water rights, and unequal distribution of water rights, are 
also frequent sources of conflict” (UNDP-SIWI Water Governance Facility, 2016). This study 
therefore analysed Kenya’s water sector institutional and regulatory framework between 2002 
and 2017. It specifically analysed the institutional roles and responsibilities, challenges and gaps 
in the current legal and institutional framework and proposes areas for review.   
 
1.2 The Water Sector Landscape in Kenya 
Despite years of investment in the water sector by the government and its development partners, 
Kenya continues to face serious water access challenges. In 2013, 52.6 percent of households in 
Kenya were reported to be using water from an improved source, 19.2 percent had access to 
piped water and 5.9 percent had piped water to their dwelling. Twelve percent of the population 
had access to borehole water. However, the single most common source of water across Kenya 
is the river (unimproved) at 23.2 percent. Water vendors are used by 5.2 percent of the 
population which is a sizeable proportion of the population spending money and exposed to the 
risk of potentially lower quality water (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) and Society 
for International Development (SID), 2013). In 2014, 66.9 percent of the Kenyan population 
had access to an improved source of drinking water with 57 percent having access in rural areas 
and 85.7 percent in urban areas (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS), 2015). There are, 
however, inequalities in access to water from an improved source. Data from 2015/2016 shows 
that at least 80 percent of households have access to water from an improved source in ten 
counties (Nairobi, Kiambu, Kakamega, Kisii, Vihiga, Kajiado, Nyamira, Nyeri, Mombasa and 
Nyandarua) while in contrast, over 50 percent of households do not have access in Nandi, Wajir, 
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Elgeyo-Marakwet, Marsabit, Samburu, West Pokot, Narok, Homa Bay, Mandera, Baringo and 
Bomet (Development Initiatives, 2018). 
 
Kenya’s water sector continues to face operation and maintenance challenges emerging from 
poor management practices, inadequate funding of the sector and disproportionate funding 
within the sector (Chepyegon & Kamiya, 2018). This is despite significant investments by the 
government and its development partners over the years. Since independence, the country’s 
public water services have continued to deteriorate failing to meet the demand of the increasing 
population. Kenya’s natural water replenishing rate is classified as one of the lowest in the world 
making it a chronically water scarce country (Government of Kenya Ministry of Water and 
Irrigation, 2005). 
 
Prior to 1974, water was managed by the Department of Water Development (DWD) which was 
housed in various ministries including Public Works, Natural Resources and Agriculture. In 
1974, a National Water Master Plan Initiative was launched whose primary aim was to ensure 
availability of potable water within reasonable distance to all households by 2000. In line with 
the 1974 Initiative, the Government upgraded the Ministry of Agriculture’s Department of 
Water Development into the Ministry of Water which embarked on an ambitious water supply 
development program. Unfortunately, in the 1980s, Government experienced budget constraints 
which curtailed these efforts. Priority was therefore given to the rehabilitation of existing 
schemes and construction of a number of huge water projects that included the Baricho and 
Kilimanjaro water schemes located at the Kenyan Coast and the Eastern regions respectively 
(Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), 2007). 
 
In 1988, the National Water Conservation and Pipeline Corporation (NWCPC) was established 
under the State Corporations Act to manage government operated water supply systems 
(Mumma, 2007). The National Water Conservation and Pipeline Corporation (NWCPC) and the 
local authorities known as Municipalities and in the case of Nairobi, the Nairobi City Council, 
were mandated by law to manage water and sanitation services. The local authorities had the 
power to establish and operate water supply systems under the areas of their jurisdictions and 
also create and operate sewerage services. Under this framework, NWCPC had the 
responsibility of managing the government operated water supply systems. The overall 
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responsibility of development and management of water supply systems was the mandate of the 
Ministry of Water (Migai, 2007).  
 
The legislation further created a number of other institutions; the Ministry of Water and 
Irrigation, the Water Resources Authority, Catchment Boards, Regional Water Committees, the 
Water Apportionment Board, Local Water Authorities, and Water Undertakers (Government of 
Kenya, 2002). The result was that the water sector was considered ineffective with poor response 
to client needs since decision-making was highly centralized (Wambua, 2004). Decision making 
processes had very little room for public participation and private sector participation was not 
envisioned. Further, whereas many institutions were created under the law, there was ineffective 
separation of functions creating “uncertainty in decision making” (Migai, 2007). This resulted 
in a large section of the population being underserved (Wambua, 2004).  
 
As a result, a new water policy was adopted in 1999 by the government that sought to establish 
a sustainable and efficient water management system in the country (Government of Kenya, 
1999). The policy moved government from service provision and restricted it to regulatory 
functions with service provision being left to municipalities, private sector and communities 
(Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), 2007). The policy also stated that the Water Act, CAP 372 
would be updated to transfer water facilities to other service providers and regulation introduced 
to give other institutions the legal mandate to provide water services and regulation mechanisms 
(Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), 2007). This policy and the taskforce set up to review the 
Water Act set ground for what was eventually described as the water sector reform 2002.  
 
In 2002, Kenya launched an ambitious reform programme for the water sector. It passed new 
legislation with clear roles for the key water institutions, increased public spending to the sector, 
and pursued separation of water resources management from water supply services which are 
characterised by different governance features. These reforms are acknowledged to be one of 
the most advanced and comprehensive in the whole of Africa (Rampa, 2011).  
 
With the promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 (Government of Kenya, 2010), a 
number of government functions were reorganized. The Constitution established two levels of 
government with separate functions but required corporation and interdependence in service 
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delivery. The fourth schedule to the Constitution lists the functions allocated to the national and 
the county governments. With respect to the water sector, the responsibility of supply of water 
and sanitation was assigned to the county governments while policy-making and protection of 
water towers was assigned to the National Government. The Constitution required the transfer 
of functions from the centralized government structure to the county governments where such 
functions were allocated to the county governments. This was to be followed by movement and 
allocation of resources to the county governments to undertake the functions.   
 
1.3 Problem statement 
Whereas the objective of the 2002 water reforms was to improve coordination and end 
duplication of roles, the resulting institutional framework was referred to as “over-
institutionalization” despite creating clear separation between ‘water resources management’ 
and ‘water services’ (Rampa, 2011). Even more significantly, perhaps, the Water Act, 2002 
failed to clearly assign and coordinate institutional responsibilities (Migai, 2007).  
 
Water and sanitation service delivery requires a high level of cooperation and interdependence 
between both levels of government. Article 189 (b) of the Constitution requires both levels of 
government to “assist, support and consult” each other and, “as appropriate, implement the 
legislation of the other level of government” (Government of Kenya, 2010). The Water Act, 
2016 aligns the regulation, management and development of water resources and water and 
sewerage services to the Constitution of Kenya 2010. The Water Act, 2002 established the Water 
Resource Management Authority, Water Services Regulatory Board, and the Water Appeal 
Board. In contrast the 2016 Act redefined and assigned new roles to previously existing bodies 
and established a greater number of institutions under four main focal areas; regulation of 
management and use of water resources, water services, Water Sector Trust Fund and Dispute 
Resolution (Government of Kenya, 2016).  
 
Few researchers have taken a historical analysis of Kenya’s water policies to identify gaps and 
discontinuities that have affected water management and service delivery. Kaijser (2003) and 
Nilsson (2006) argue that unless a historical perspective is applied, fundamental problems in the 
delivery of services in the sector may be overlooked in analyses. Nilsson and Nyanchanga 
(2008) undertook one such study that provided a historical overview of water policy in Kenya 
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from 1900 to 1990, contextualizing their findings in the Water sector reforms of the late ‘90s 
and early 2000s.  
 
Studies had been conducted to analyse the implications of the Water Act, 2002 (Mumma, 2007), 
issues that are hampering progress in improving water sector governance in Kenya (Rampa, 
2011), to highlight critical water sector reform implementation issues in Kenya (Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 2008) and to document the legal 
framework under the Constitution of Kenya 2010 (World Bank, 2015). There was, however, no 
sequential documentation on the various regulatory and institutional framework changes and 
their resulting effect on the water sector in Kenya. Previous studies also fail to classify the nature 
of the drivers for change in terms of exogenous and endogenous factors and have not examined 
the legislation in line with the principles that water legislation should adhere to. The literature 
further fails to examine key institutions created for water governance and the specific roles and 
responsibilities assigned to them. 
 
This study therefore analysed Kenya’s water sector institutional and regulatory framework 
between 2002 and 2017, with the exogenous and endogenous factors, principles and roles, rights 
and responsibilities in the political, social, economic and environmental dimensions taken into 
consideration. It identified gaps in the regulatory framework, the resulting challenges in 
implementation and proposes possible areas of review to the policy framework.   
 
1.4 Research objectives 
The main objective was to analyse Kenya’s water sector institutional and regulatory framework 
between 2002 and 2017. The specific objectives of the study were to: 
1. Examine the roles and responsibilities assigned to the various institutions created by the 
regulatory framework between 2002 and 2017 and how they have evolved.  
2. Identify the gaps in Kenya’s water sector institutional and regulatory framework 
between 2002 and 2017. 
3. Discuss challenges experienced by national water sector institutions in implementing 
their mandate as a result of the regulatory framework between 2002 and 2017. 
Based on the findings of this study, areas of review of the regulatory framework and institutional 




1.5 Research questions 
1. What are the roles assigned to the various institutions created by the regulatory 
framework between 2002 and 2017 and how have they evolved?  
2. What gaps exist as a result of the institutional and regulatory framework Kenya adopted 
between 2002 and 2017? 
3. What challenges have been experienced by the National water sector institutions in 
implementing their mandate as a result of the regulatory framework between 2002 and 
2017?   
 
1.6 Scope of the study 
This study examined the legal framework governing the water sector between 2002 and 2017. 
It specifically focused on the Water Act, 2002, the relevant aspects introduced by the 
Constitution of Kenya 2010 and the Water Act 2016. It further restricted itself to the national 
institutions created to govern and manage water resources and water services, their evolving 
roles, gaps and challenges experienced.    
 
1.7 Significance of the study 
This sequential analysis complements the current discourse on water reform by highlighting 
gaps in legislation and challenges experienced by the various institutions. It informs the areas 
of improvement in policy and regulatory frameworks for effective management of the country’s 













CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter provides a critical review of literature on water regulation or legislation and studies 
conducted on this subject. It is discussed under the following sub-headings: public interest 
theory, empirical literature on the water sector regulatory framework, institutional roles, gaps in 
legislation and challenges experienced in implementation of the water laws; research gap and 
conceptual framework.  
 
2.1 Public Interest Theory  
‘Theories of regulation try to explain why regulation is adopted’ (Guerin, 2003). The public 
interest theory posits that regulation is public demand driven and it is used to correct market 
failure and help achieve economic efficiency. There are three key elements of public interest 
theory which include ‘existence of market failure’, existence of ‘an efficient political process’ 
and ‘the choice of efficient regulatory institutions’ (Den Hertog, 2010). It assumes that the 
regulatory regime will both aim for and achieve economic efficiency. This theory assigns the 
regulatory responsibility to government assuming that government is a neutral body. It, 
however, fails to predict how the public interest is translated through political institutions into a 
decision, who will be regulated and who will receive the benefits or bear the costs, or the form 
of the regulation (Den Hertog, 1999).  
 
The public interest theory is based on the premise that the ideal political community is that in 
which property is owned in common and serves a common interest as envisioned by Plato (Den 
Hertog, 2010). The theory postulates that inefficiency or inequity needs to be corrected through 
regulation so that it responds to public demand in a satisfactory manner. This is based on the 
premise that service provision is inherently inefficient and inequitable when left to operate on 
its own (Glaeser & Shleifer, 2003). Regulation is needed in terms of formulating and enforcing 
policies, standards, guidelines and plans that ensure that instead of serving selfish interests of 
particular individuals or groups of people in society, services are provided to benefit society as 
a whole (Armstrong & Sappington, 2007). This theory was applied in this study to analyse the 
nature of regulation that takes place in the regulation of the management of water resources and 
service delivery and the aspects put in place by the Acts to cater for the public interest.  
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2.2 Empirical literature 
 
2.2.1 Water sector regulatory framework 
The Water sector globally, is inherently complex. It connects across sectors, people, scales and 
geography (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2005). As such, water 
policy is intricate, with multiple decision makers, institutional arrangements, policy tools and 
an ever-increasing number of stakeholders. This results in a complexity which often results in 
policies that are “disjointed, reactionary and at odds with a system of coordinated water 
management” (Gerlak, 2006).  
 
Gerlak (2006) examined five historical streams of water policy in the United States, revealing 
the strain and stresses of intergovernmental relations pertaining to water resource management.  
The review focused on the United States of America water policy over a period of 250 years 
and revealed a highly fragmented policy making environment with multiple agencies managing 
narrow components or constituencies and a patchwork of statutes and laws covering everything 
from governance to resource management, from hydro power to flood control. Her study noted 
over eighteen federal agencies, twenty-five water programs, over seventy appropriations 
accounts, twenty-three committees and sub-committees in Congress and over 200 federal rules 
and regulations which have resulted in an increasingly volatile and highly contested water 
landscape. 
 
Kaika (2003) examines the intricate process of developing the European Union's Water 
Framework Directive and saw the Directive as a response to economic, political and social 
changes related to water management, including the shift from government to governance, the 
liberalization of water markets and the emergence of a new set of institutions, actors, etc. and 
their respective relations (i.e. social capital).  For the European Union, the development of the 
Water Framework Directive in 2000 was a response to, among other things, “the increasing 
complexity of water resource management, the increasing number of actors and institutions 
involved in the process and the newly vested economic interests in water supply” (Kaika, 2003).   
The World Bank’s 2017 report on the Performance of Water Utilities in Africa shows that the 
demand created by Africa’s rapidly growing urban population, which grew by 80% (from 206 
million to 373 million people) between 2000 and 2015 has not been met by the region’s water 
11 
 
supply (Van den Berg & Alexander, 2017). Regulation is intended to provide a balance between 
social and commercial goals. Studies show that African countries with formal regulatory 
agencies in place provide better customer protection and higher service quality but in contrast, 
these countries also have low water coverage and their financial and operational performance is 
lower than those without a regulator (Van den Berg & Danilenko, 2017). 
 
Saleth and Dinar (2000) explored the highlights in institutional changes in water sector across 
eleven countries. Their paper aimed to unravel the nature and origin of the changes in water law, 
water policy, and water administration and evaluate their implications for global water sector 
policy, based on a review of water institutional changes in 11 countries: Mexico, Chile, Brazil, 
Spain, Morocco, Israel, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Australia, China, and India. In Mexico for 
instance, they trace water reforms from 1988, identifying various legal changes beginning with 
the irrigation segment in 1988 which saw a transfer of public irrigation systems to user groups. 
In their analysis of the water sector changes in Mexico, they identify a common theme towards 
decentralization and privatization initiatives. Several African countries have adopted a 
community-based model for water service provision as opposed to the traditional contracting 
out model. While this has been beneficial, the amalgamation of both these systems of 
management has been more effective as the formal user associations take on the role of local 
regulatory bodies while functions remain on a contractual basis (Jaglin, 2002). 
 
Nilsson and Nyanchanga (2008) set out to understand how urban water technology co-evolves 
with social change in Kenya and Uganda, and in particular; understanding the drivers of 
technological change and the barriers that impede change. They found that between 1900 and 
1990, policy changes were largely as a result of increasing political influence on the policy 
rather than technical input and a focus on social objectives. Kenya instituted water sector 
reforms in 2002, described as the most comprehensive reform in the water sector in any country.  
It established a “dual governance system” in which distinct institutions were to support water 
resource management as separate from those charged with water service delivery (Rampa, 
2011).  
 
Saleth and Dinar (2000) identified the sources of policy and legal changes by looking into 
patterns and clear trends across countries. In their review, they postulate that there are 
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endogenous and exogenous sources of change, the former comprising of factors such as water 
scarcity, performance deterioration, and financial non-viability while the latter includes factors 
such as macroeconomic crisis, political reform, natural calamities and technological progress. 
According to them, ‘these factors together raise the opportunity costs of institutional change, 
reduce corresponding transaction costs and create pro-reform climate. In identifying common 
trends in institutional changes in water policies, they come up with four general themes; a shift 
in focus from water development to water allocation, a renewed focus on decentralization and 
privatization, a move towards integrated resource management and an insistence on financial 
viability and physical sustainability (Saleth & Dinar, 2000). 
 
Regulatory framework changes may be to correct for challenges posed by the multiplicity of 
actors, policy and institutional frameworks makers leading to disjointed policies as seen in the 
case of the United States of America and the European Union. It could result from changing 
population demands where regulation is changed to provide a balance between social and 
commercial goals. In some cases it results from changing ownership of responsibility and 
possibly reducing the responsibilities of Governement e.g. in Mexico where the focus is on 
decentralization and privatization and in some African countries which have adopted 
community-based model for water service provision as opposed to the traditional contracting 
out model. Policy changes can also result from political influence on the policy rather than 
technical input and a focus on social objectives such as Kenya’s establishment of a “dual 
governance system” to cater for water resource management and water service delivery.  
 
Ehrhardt, Groom, Halpern, and O'Connor (2007) discuss the regulation of water and sanitation 
services in urban areas. They explored ways of thinking about regulatory design as part of a 
wider, country-specific program to reform the way in which water supply and sanitation services 
are provided and paid for. They also discuss how to approach regulatory design by encouraging 
decision makers and their advisors to apply sound principles within country-specific settings, 
rather than advocate best-practice models without a thorough analysis of whether these are 
suitable for the country's context. They further state that a good regulatory system should 
embody the following principles; coherence between tariffs and service standards, 




Mwanza (2010) in his study to determine the roles and institutional arrangements for economic 
regulation of urban water services in Sub-Saharan Africa lists proportionality, accountability, 
consistency, transparency and services to the urban poor as features of a good regulatory system. 
He further states that a regulatory framework should include approval of tariffs to ensure 
commercial viability of the service providers, protection of consumers against monopoly 
practices of service providers, the regulator being a repository of knowledge and experience of 
water issues in the country as well as helping the poor gain sustained access to water services. 
Banerjee and Morella came up with a regulation index that comprises of parameters such as 
autonomy, accountability, transparency and tools through which they assessed the effectiveness 
of the various regulatory frameworks (Banerjee & Morella, 2011).  
 
Trémolet and Hunt (2006) while seeking to provide practical guidance on how regulatory 
frameworks can be designed and implemented in a way that is more conducive to expanding 
access and improving service to poor customers stated that design should avoid overambitious 
and unrealistic coverage targets, allow differentiated service levels, give incentives to the main 
operator to subcontract with smaller operators, define clear institutional mechanisms to verify 
enforcement to coverage targets and use incentives to ensure the operators serve the poor. 
 
2.2.2 Institutional roles in water governance and management 
Governing water includes the formulation, establishment and implementation of water policies, 
legislation and institutions, and clarification of the roles and responsibilities of government, civil 
society and the private sector in relation water resources and services (UNDP-SIWI Water 
Governance Facility , 2016).  
 
A primary responsibility of the government is to ensure good water governance. It is not the 
responsibility of the government to undertake all the functions of water governance, but it does 
have a responsibility to ensure that such a framework exists. The government’s responsibilities 
include ensuring that long-term water policies and plans are established and interested parties, 
including water users, environmental and social advocates, and the broader community, have 
the opportunity for effective engagement in the process (Camkin & Neto, 2016). Camkin’s and 
Neto’s study examined the rights and responsibilities of various actors in water governance 
through a selection of key water issues, including human rights to water and sanitation, 
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allocation of water for commercial purposes, security of water entitlements, water use 
efficiency, funding water resource management (WRM), the role of science, environmental 
advocacy and the maintenance of ecosystem services (ES). It also examined the balance of rights 
and responsibilities of the various players in water governance to encourage discussion by 
scholars and policy practitioners on whether the right balance is currently being achieved, 
particularly with regard to the achievement of intergenerational equity. 
 
Nilsson and Nyanchanga (2008) found that from 1900 to 1990 the major change that had taken 
place is the general water sector institutional framework. As a result of the Water Act, 2002 
several institutions were created under the law with ineffective separation of functions creating 
“uncertainty in decision making” (Mumma, 2007). Similarly, Rampa (2011), found that the 
water management structure in Kenya is in “numerous institutions, layers of geographical 
interventions and competencies.  
 
Water Governance has four dimensions; social, economic, political and environmental (UNDP-
SIWI Water Governance Facility , 2016). The social aspect covers the equitable distribution of 
water resources and services among various social and economic groups and the resulting effects 
on society. Political aspect ensures equal rights and opportunities for water stakeholders to take 
part in decision making processes. Economic dimension ensures efficiency in water allocation 
and use. Environmental aspect caters for sustainable use of water.  
 
Roles, rights, and responsibilities in the social dimension of water governance relate to; human 
rights to water and sanitation, participatory processes and decentralized decision making and 
building capacity for effective water governance. In the economic dimension the roles, rights 
and responsibilities are; securing water access entitlements, meeting the costs of a sustainable 
water future and ensuring productive and efficient use of a community asset. The political 
dimension includes; establishing and maintaining an inclusive water governance framework, 
transparency in water policy planning and decision making and the role of science in decision 
making. Lastly, the environmental dimension includes; advocating for the environment, new 
policy thinking: linking integrated water resources management (IWRM) and an environmental 
sustainability approach and water use and intergenerational equity (Camkin & Neto, 2016). 
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Table 2.1 tabulates the dimensions, their definition and examples of roles, rights and 
responsibilities under each. 
 
Table 2. 1 Water Governance Dimensions 
Dimension Definition Examples of roles, rights and 
responsibilities 
Social The equitable distribution of water 
resources and services among various 
social and economic groups and its 
effects on society. 
 Human Rights to Water and 
Sanitation 
 Participatory Processes and 
Decentralized Decision 
Making 
 Building Capacity for 
Effective Water Governance 
 
Economic Efficiency in water allocation and use 
and the role of water in overall 
economic growth. 
 Secure Water Access 
Entitlements 
 Meeting the Costs of a 
Sustainable Water Future 
 Ensuring Productive and 
Efficient Use of a Community 
Asset 
 
Political Equal rights and opportunities for 
water stakeholders to take part in 
decision-making processes. 
Participation facilitates more informed 
decision making and more effective 
implementation and enhances conflict 
resolution. 
 Establishing and Maintaining 
an Inclusive Water 
Governance Framework 
 Transparency in Water Policy 
Planning and Decision 
Making 
 The Role of Science in 
Decision Making 
 
Environmental Sustainable use of water and related 
ecosystem services. The sufficient flow 
of water of appropriate quality is 
critical to maintaining ecosystem 
functions and services that build upon 
them. 
 Water Use and 
Intergenerational Equity 
 Advocating for the 
Environment 
 New Policy Thinking: 
Linking Integrated Water 
Resources Management 
(IWRM) and an Ecosystem 
Services Approach 
 




2.2.3 Regulatory gaps in the water sector 
In Africa only 12.9% of the water utilities operate efficiently further supporting the fact that 
Africa’s water sector operates at an extremely high level of inefficiency (Estache & Kouassi, 
2002). This was concluded after an analysis of the determinants of the efficiency levels reached 
by twenty-one African water utilities. They assessed efficiency through the estimation of a 
production frontier for the sector in Africa. And the authors show that the institutional capacity 
of the country, as well as its governance quality, are significant driving factors in the 
performance of each firm.  
 
McGarry, Mugisha, Hoang-Gia, Unheim and Myles (2010) investigated whether poor 
governance has been a major contributing factor to lack of sustainability. They further assessed 
the state of water sector governance in Africa looking at a very broad range of governance-
related elements, including legislation and regulation, decentralization and devolution, sector-
wide approaches, financial management, monitoring and evaluation, accountability and 
corruption, civil society participation, gender, alternative service provision, public-private 
partnerships and equitable service delivery. They found that one of the reasons for this could be 
that the laws and regulations defining African water legislation are often extremely complex 
and contain gaping holes that ultimately hinder good governance. 
 
Nilsson and Nyanchanga (2008) while concluding that water provision is a socio technical 
system, they add that policy change is not the only factor required to make water sector reforms 
successful other factors need to be considered e.g. actors involved. Further they conclude that a 
long-term perspective is necessary to unearth some of the reasons for institutional shortcomings 
and why they persist. 
 
In Brazil changes in the water sector began in 1988 whereas the water national policy law was 
enacted in 1997. With many successive changes in laws and acts, consolidating water issues 
into a single administrative entity has all but failed with many water-related functions remaining 
dispersed. Across the range of counties studied, most water policies remain silent on the issue 
of water pollution, which has now come to the fore as a critical determinant to water quality and 




Naiga, Penker and Hogl (2015) examined Uganda’s experience with the shift from a supply 
driven to a demand driven approach in rural water provision since 1990. The paper aimed to 
shed light on the rural population’s access to safe water within the changing institutional 
frameworks by conducting an analysis on individual and group interviews with key informants 
from national to community levels and relevant official documents with the ‘Social-Ecological 
Systems’ framework. In their discussion, they identify operation and maintenance of drinking 
water infrastructure as a major challenge as well as the incompleteness and inconsistencies 
within the devolution process in Uganda and hence propose that the issue in water sector 
changes is not necessarily one of approach but rather one of creating a consistent multi-actor 
and multilevel governance structure that recognized existing and past structures with a way of 
motivating local users to play a part. 
 
The Water Act, 2002 creates “conflicts between the institutions it creates and…local authorities” 
(Migai, 2007). He states this in his critique of the Kenya Water Act of 2002 where he argues 
that it established an institutional framework for water governance that is neither effective nor 
democratic and was accordingly unsuitable for efficient private sector participation. According 
to Ogendi and Ong’oa (2009), in Kenya, as in many other places around the world, legislation 
and policy on water use and management do not take customary land-tenure systems into 
account. Policymakers have realized that the two cannot be separated, since access to water in 
most cases derives from access to land. They document this in their paper which focused on 
Kenya's water policy, availability, scarcity, and the need to incorporate ethics into the use and 
management of water.  
 
In India, the government policies failed to take into account the vulnerability and scarcity of 
water when setting the prices. This led to the rural and urban poor paying a disproportionate 
amount for water by having to invest in private water sources or pay private vendors rates much 
higher than those charged by municipalities or irrigation departments. The fragmented nature of 
Governance also led to inconsistent policies between national and state governments which have 
similar sector-specific water departments, with separate ones for drinking water, others for 
major versus minor irrigation or hydropower, and others for environmental monitoring making 




2.2.4 Challenges in implementing water policies 
A study examining Australia’s implementation of a national regulatory framework to support 
the development of robust and mature water markets found that even for countries with long 
histories of decentralization like the United States of America and Australia, challenges from 
ecosystem complexities and policy fragmentation persist (Waye & Son, 2010).  In an effort to 
introduce benefits of the private sector approach including efficiency and productivity, Kenya’s 
Water Act, 2002 set the stage for commercialization of the water sector by requiring consumers 
to pay for water services (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 
2008). This was documented in a study focusing on the key challenges of major importance in 
the water supply and sanitation reforms in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, and the 
lessons that have been learned.  
 
Whereas the commercialization of water services was relatively successful it meant that the 
Water Service Providers concentrated on the urban towns which have higher disposable income 
and infrastructure (Migai, 2007; Rampa, 2011; Mumma, 2007). The 2002 reform thus 
contributed further to the rural-urban divide that has characterized the development of Kenya 
since independence (Migai, 2007). The commercialization of water further created a dense 
network of business interests resulting in business competition and illegal transactions that led 
to poor supply and exorbitant pricing. This further created a complex relation between the water 
companies established by local authorities and other service providers often, conflictual, with 
private interests influencing decisions and the approach of the water companies (Migai, 2007;  
Rampa, 2011). 
 
A study to investigate the factors influencing water sector reforms in Tanathi Water Services 
Board found that the lack of access to finance and the technical and managerial capacity to use 
finance effectively, resistance from the formal public utilities, lack of clear guidelines for the 
provision and regulation of private sector involvement in the financing and management of 
water supply and sewerage services influence water sector reforms in Tanathi Water Services 





Moraa, Otieno, and Salim (2012) in thier paper reviewing Kenya’s water supply and sanitation 
situation, governance structure in the water sector which includes the policies, and institutions 
set to address water problems and identifying key water governance components and the use of 
technology as a strategic tool in the thematic area of water highlight some of the challenges 
faced by the Ministry of Water’s capacity to achieve envisaged water reform targets. They 
included the lack of unified framework for the management of water resources, unwillingness 
by some local authorities to implement certain aspects of the water reforms, inadequate private 
sector investment in water infrastructure, continued human settlements in water catchment 
areas, destruction of forests due to lack of irrigation and land reclamation policies, un-
harmonized data or information system, weak monitoring and evaluation systems, ineffective 
communication and shortage of staff and/or skills. 
 
A study conducted to critically reflect on the limitations of water-centric perspectives found that 
lack of leadership or political will, fragmented and uncoordinated weak institutions, corruption, 
insufficient involvement or participation of the people and failure to recognize key connections 
among the environmental, economic and social aspects of water are key shortcomings in water 
governance (De Loë & Patterson, 2017). The study also; surveyed the water governance 
literature to identify external connections that can influence water governance; examined the 
extent to which four major approaches (Integrated Water Resources Management, water 
security, water-energy-food nexus, water resilience) address actors, drivers, and institutions that 
connect water governance to other sectors and decision making situations and considered key 
conceptual and practical challenges of moving beyond water-centric approaches where this is 
warranted. 
 
A study conducted in South Africa on the relationship between knowledge, agency, and shame 
found that trust and absence of knowledge among water users and managers influenced water 
management policies (Goldin, 2010). A study was conducted in Rwanda to guide the 
establishment of a national water resources management authority in Rwanda that will manage 
and coordinate the national water resources in a sustainable way taking the water resources 
management bodies in Rwanda, in comparison with the Kenyan water resources management 
bodies as a good example. An extensive review was conducted using governmental documents, 
and key institutional elements were analysed by evaluating their performance in comparing with 
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the Kenyan institutions. It focused on water management as opposed to water regulation and 
identified institutional bottlenecks with lack of clarity as to the roles and responsibilities of the 
various stakeholders as one of the key impediments to the development and management of 
water resources in a sustainable way (Aboniyo, Umulisa, Bizimana, Pascal, & Mourad, 2017). 
 
Perret (2002) studied water policies and smallholding irrigation schemes in South Africa and 
looked at the National Water Act (1998) which was described as ‘Internationally recognized 
and most promising legal framework’. The paper describes the origin and history of 
smallholding irrigation schemes, analyses the implications of the 1998 National Water Act on 
those schemes, analyses water rights and highlights contradictions, uncertainties and possible 
threats which may hinder further development in smallholding irrigation schemes. The paper 
identified various challenges among them mixed up objectives that were contradictory, lack of 
clarity on the implementation of features on certain key issues and lack of technical competency 
required to implement the Act within the implementing agencies.   
 
The main challenge in Africa does not lie in the water sector directly but instead the weakness 
of institutions and governance issues that lead to excess costs in the sector (Estache & Kouassi, 
2002). 
 
2.3 Key findings and research gaps  
The literature on regulatory framework captures the regulatory changes adopted by various 
countries and the drivers for the change. It further captures the aim of the reforms. The principles 
or features that make a good regulatory design include; accountability and transparency, 
autonomy, targets set, incentives provided, service levels, enforcement mechanism in place, 
predictability, credibility and coherence. The roles and responsibilities have been categorized 
into four dimensions; political, social, environmental and economic. Gaps identified include; 
failure to consider all actors, lack of long-term perspective, failure to consider other factors that 
affect water resource management i.e. land tenure systems, pricing that does not consider 
vulnerability and scarcity of water and creation of conflict between institutions. Challenges 
identified include policy fragmentation, complex legislation, institutional capacity and financial 
challenges, leadership challenges and lack of political will, uncoordinated institutions and 
21 
 
unintended consequences e.g. inequality, illegal transactions and business competition due to 
commercialization of water. 
 
The literature did not classify the nature of the drivers for change in terms of exogenous and 
endogenous factors and did not examine the legislation in line with the principles that water 
legislation should adhere to. The literature further fails to examine key institutions created for 
water governance and the specific roles and responsibilities assigned to them. This research 
therefore analysed Kenya’s water sector institutional framework between 2002 and 2017 with 
the exogenous and endogenous factors, principles and roles, rights and responsibilities in the 
political, social, economic and environmental dimensions taken into consideration. 
 
2.4 Conceptual framework 
A conceptual framework is an analytical tool with several variations and contexts used to 
make conceptual distinctions and organize ideas. It maps out the actions required in the course 
of a study based on previous research and is informed by the current study a researcher is 
conducting. The framework is the researcher’s understanding of how the concepts in the study 
connect with each other. It therefore identifies the concepts used in the research. It is the 
researcher’s “map” in pursuing the investigation. It is therefore relevant for both qualitative and 
quantitative research (Regoniel, 2015). 
 
The Conceptual framework below illustrates the various components of the study and their 
relationships. The framework is presented as a flow diagram because that is how policy 
processes flow; from enacting the laws, to setting up the implementing institutions, to 
implementing the laws (where challenges and gaps are identified) and finally reviewing the laws 
in light of the lessons learnt during the implementation. 
The section further explains the measure for each of the components and the data that will be 








Figure 2. 1 Conceptual Framework 
 
The Water Legislation are the Water Act, 2002 and Water Act, 2016. They were accessed online 
from the ‘Kenya Law’ which is an online platform under the judiciary which houses all Legal 
information.  
 
The drivers for the changes in the regulatory framework were examined based on whether it was 
as a result of exogenous (water scarcity, performance deterioration, and financial non-viability) 
or endogenous factors (macroeconomic crisis, political reform, natural calamities and 
technological progress). These parameters of examining the drivers are derived from the 
theoretical framework presented in Section 2.2.1. The Act was further examined to determine 
whether they embody the features of a good regulatory framework listed in section 2.2.1. This 
was determined from data obtained during the Key Informant Interviews and the document 
review of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010.  
 
The Water Acts were examined to identify the institutions created under the Water Act, 2002 
and the Water Act, 2016. Once the institutions were determined and listed the roles assigned to 
each were identified. The roles were examined to determine if they had changed or remained 
similar between the Water Act, 2002 and the Water Act, 2016. The roles were further examined 



























and economic roles as envisioned presented in section 2.2.2. This was from data obtained from 
document review of the Water Act, 2002 and the Water Act, 2016. 
 
The gaps were identified in the Water Acts in terms of the institutions created and the roles 
assigned to them and whether the Acts assigned the various institutions all the relevant roles 
necessary for efficient water sector regulation e.g. political roles, social roles, environmental 
roles and economic roles. The principles of transparency, accountability, autonomy, incentive 
provision, coherence, tariff setting, and service provision were further examined for in the Acts. 
This was based on data from document review of the Water Act, 2002 and the Water Act, 2016. 
Challenges were determined from the Key Informant Interviews who were asked whether they 
have experienced any challenges in the execution of the roles assigned to their respective 
institutions. Additionally, an examination of data from the Water Acts on overlapping roles was 
conducted. Respondents were asked to identify gaps in the laws. The study proposes areas in 
the legislation that require review as its major outcome.  
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
This chapter outlines the research design of the study, the target population, sampling methods 
and procedures, data collection and analysis methods, strategies of ensuring research quality and 
ethics and outlines the data collection tools that were used for the research. 
 
3.1 Research design 
Eller, Gerber and Robinson (2018) define research design as ‘the process by which data 
gathering efforts are structured and defined’. Akhtar, Shah, Rafiq and Khan (2016) on the other 
hand define research design as ‘the glue that holds all elements of a research work together’. 
This study employed a cross-sectional and descriptive research design to analyse Kenya’s water 
sector institutional framework between 2002 and 2017. It specifically focused on the changes 
in the institutional framework and their roles, identified the gaps and challenges and proposes 
areas of review to the water sector regulation. Sampling procedures, data collection and analysis 
were completed within a restricted time frame.  
 
The cross-sectional design was relevant as data would be collected at one point in time. It is 
descriptive in nature given that it presents the changes in Kenya’s institutional framework from 
2002 to 2017 as depicted in the Water Act, 2002, and the Water Act, 2016.  
 
The study employed a qualitative approach. Qualitative research is characterized by the use of 
non-numerical forms of data especially in developing theory or describing and explaining 
complex concepts that are not easily operationalized (Eller, Gerber, & Robinson, 2018). Three 
broad categories of qualitative research of interest exists: observational studies, interview 
studies and documentary or textual analysis of various written records (Pathak, Jena, & Kalra, 
2013). This study undertook an analysis of the changes of the water sector regulation after 
undertaking an intensive document review of existing water policies from 2002 to 2017 and 
obtained views on the same from a selected group of key informants in the water sector using 
interviews. 
 
3.2 Population and sampling 
The study population included the water institutions which were the Water Services Regulatory 
Board (WASREB) and the Water Resources Authority (WRA). Other sources of data included; 
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the Water Act, 2002, the Water Act, 2016, the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. Purposive sampling 
is a method of non-probability sampling that involves the selection of participants based on their 
relevance to the research questions (Bryman, 2012). Purposive sampling approach is defined as 
a nonprobability sample that is drawn specifically on existing knowledge of population 
characteristics in order to serve a specific need of a study question (Warren, Gerber, & Scott, 
2018).  
 
Purposive sampling was used to identify six water institutions namely; the Ministry of Water 
and Irrigation, the Water Services Regulatory Board (WASREB), Water Resources Authority 
(WRA), National Water Harvesting and Storage Authority, Water Sector Trust Fund and the 
Water Works development Agencies. One individual was identified with the help of the 
institutional management based on their involvement in the drafting and/or implementation of 
the selected documents for analysis and, therefore, their ability to provide relevant information, 
ideas, and insights on the subject under investigation.  
 
Out of this sample, four key informants participated in the study. Two from the Water Services 
Regulatory Board (WASREB); the Director of Corporate Services and the Inspectorate Services 
Manager and two from the Water Resources Authority (WRA); the Head of Planning, Research 
and Development and the Head of Legal. The institution aided in the identification of the 
individual based on the criteria. Data collection continued until a saturation point was reached, 
and sufficient data gathered to respond to all the research questions. Snowballing was used 
where a key informant was unable to provide the information required. They were requested to 
refer the researcher to the appropriate/relevant staff member who was able to provide the 
information.   
 
3.3 Data collection methods 
Data collection was conducted in two parts.  The first part entailed document analysis where the 
researcher conducted content analysis of the Water Act, 2002, the Water Act, 2016 and the 
Constitution of Kenya, 2010. The purpose of the review was to establish the institutional 
framework and specific roles assigned to each water institution. A document review template 




The second part involved key informant interviews with four key Officials in the Water Services 
Regulatory Board (WASREB) and the Water Resources Authority (WRA). The key informants 
included individuals who are directly involved in the design and/or implementation of the 
policies and have first-hand knowledge on the changes in the policy and regulatory framework 
in the water sector, the gaps within the institutional framework and the challenges facing the 
regulation of the water sector. Consent was obtained from the institutional management to allow 
the researcher to interview their staff. The key informant interview guide (Appendix V) was 
used to guide the interview process which took about one hour. Face to face interviews were 
conducted and note taking used to record the responses provided. The interview questions were 
open ended and specific. In cases where the key informant was not able to provide the 
information required the researcher requested that he or she refers to a staff member who was 
able to provide the information after which consenting was obtained and interview conducted.  
 
3.4 Data analysis approaches 
Data from the notebooks was typed and organized after each interview by the researcher. The 
data was then coded by reading through the transcripts while taking notes about significant 
remarks and observations that were used to generate themes. This resulted in the development 
of an index of words that guided the interpretation. The codes were then examined to determine 
whether; two or more codes had been used to describe the same phenomenon, codes related to 
categories in literature review or whether the respondents believed that there is a link between 
two or more codes. The coding units were then categorised by attaching the relevant data to 
their respective codes until saturation was reached. This enabled the researcher to generate 
general theoretical ideas based on emerging pattern and relationships.  
 
A coding schedule was used to code and categorize the data during the document analysis of the 
Water Act, 2002 and the Water Act, 2016 in terms of institutions formed, their respective roles 
and gaps identified. The data from the document analysis and the KIIs were then merged by 
determining cross cutting codes and themes which were categorised under the same codes. 




3.5 Data Presentation and dissemination 
Data is presented in form of a narrative and tables to indicate the roles and responsibilities. An 
overview of the findings in the form of a policy brief will be developed and shared with each of 
the participating institutions in order to enable them to obtain the findings and recommendations 
emanating from the research.   
 
3.6 Research quality  
3.6.1 Reliability 
The researcher ensured that there was adequate representation of all the issues that emerged 
from the qualitative data. To ensure reliability, this methodology section provides a detailed 
explanation of the research process to allow for replication. Three researchers were also 
involved in the coding and categorizing of data in order to explore inter-judge reliability both in 
the document review and the interview data analysis.  
 
3.6.2 Validity 
The key informants comprised of individuals who were directly involved in drafting, 
implementation and/or enforcement of the Water Act 2002 and the Water Act 2016. The 
researcher selected Key Informants who had experience designing, implementing or enforcing 
water policies since the research was specific to this area. 
 
3.7 Ethical Considerations 
Ethical approval was sought from the Strathmore University Ethics Review Board (Appendix 
I). A Research Authorization Permit was obtained from the National Commission for Science, 
Technology and Innovation (Appendix II).  Permission was sought from the participating 
institutions prior to the data collection. Informed consent was obtained from all the key 
informant interview participants by explaining in detail the purpose of the research, expected 
outcomes, benefits, expected time required for participation, assuring them of privacy, 
confidentiality measures and the option to withdraw from the study at any given point prior to 
giving them an opportunity to voluntarily decide whether to participate in the study. A copy of 
the informed Consent form can be found in Appendix IV. Confidentiality of the respondents 
was further observed by using interview codes in the data from the interviews to ensure that data 




CHAPTER FOUR: DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION 
The chapter presents the findings of this study which sought to analyse Kenya’s water sector 
institutional and regulatory framework between 2002 and 2017. This chapter covers the 
institutional roles and responsibilities assigned by the Water Act of 2002 and 2016, gaps in the 
legal or regulatory framework and challenges experienced in the implementation or carrying out 
of the various responsibilities. 
 
4.1 Constitution of Kenya, 2010 
The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 introduced fundamental conceptual and legal changes to the 
water sector. The first aspect is the definition of water sources such as lakes, rivers and other 
water bodies as public land which is held in trust by the national government for the people of 
Kenya. The second element is that the constitution enshrined the right to water as a human right. 
Article 43 of the Constitution guarantees every citizen the right to water. Further under article 
21(2) of the Constitution, the state has an obligation to take measures including legislative, 
policy and other measures to realize the rights guaranteed to citizens including the right to water. 
The third aspect is the introduction of two levels of government, the National Government and 
the County Government.  
 
These three aspects had a significant impact on the framework for providing water and sanitation 
services. The most significant aspect is the role of County Governments in the water sector. In 
the fourth schedule of the Constitution, the functions in the water sector were divided between 
the county governments and the national government. In particular, section 11(b) of Part 2 of 
the Fourth Schedule of the Constitution allocates to the County Governments functions relating 
to “implementation of specific national government policies on natural resources and 
environmental conservation, including (a) soil and water conservation…” Further Section 22 
(c) of Part 1 of the fourth schedule of the Constitution allocates to the National government the 
functions in the areas of use of international waters, water protection, securing sufficient residual 
water, hydraulic engineering and safety of dams. The National government is also required to 




The County governments are allocated “County public works and services, including storm 
water management systems in built-up areas; and water and sanitation services.” Closely related 
to the function allocation is the attempt by the fourth schedule to make a distinction between 
what are referred to as “National Public Works” and “County Public Works” with the latter 
allocated to the county governments and the former the national government. 
 
Respondents interviewed indicated that the drive for change from the Water Act, 2002 to the 
Water Act, 2016 was primarily to align the regulatory framework to the Constitution of Kenya, 
2010. This, according to the literature review is an exogenous driver as identified by Saleth and 
Dinar (2000) who state that exogenous sources of change include political reform.  
 
4.2 Institutional roles in water governance and management 
The Water Act, 2002 provided for the management, conservation, use and control of water 
resources and for the acquisition and regulation of rights to use water. It established a number 
of institutions to implement it which included the Water Services Regulatory Board 
(WASREB), the Water Services Trust Fund (WSTF) and the Water Resources Management 
Authority (WARMA), the Catchment Area Advisory Committees (CAAC), the Water 
Resources Users Associations (WRUAs), Water Services Boards (WSBs) and the Water 
Appeals Board. The WSBs were in turn required to license Water Service Providers (WSP) in 
their areas of jurisdiction. Based on the Water Act, 2002 the sector was primarily divided into 
two main parts, water resource management and water service provision.  
 
The Water Act 2016 is the legal mechanism reforming the water sector in line with the 
Constitution of Kenya, 2010. It aims to harmonize the existing structure under the 2002 Water 
Act with the devolved structure. The Water Act, 2016 establishes the Water Resources Authority 
(WRA), the Basin Water Resources Committee (BWRC), the Water Resources Users 
Associations (WRUAs), the Water Services Regulatory Board (WASREB), the Water Works 
Development Agencies (WWDAs), the National Water Harvesting and Storage Authority 
(NWHSA),the Water Sector Trust Fund (WSTF) and the Water Tribunal. These institutions are 
all in operation, majority having been renamed from previously existing institutions. Table 4.1 




Table 4.1 Institutions established by the Water Act, 2002 and the Water Act, 2016 
 Water Act 2002 Water Act 2016 
1. Water Resources Management Authority Water Resources Authority 
2. Water Services Regulatory Board Water Services Regulatory Board 
3. Water Services Boards Water Works Development Agency 
4. Catchment Area Advisory Committees Basin Water Resources Committee 
5. Water Resources Users Associations Water Resources Users Associations 
6. Water Services Trust Fund Water Sector Trust Fund  
7. Water Appeals Board Water Tribunal 
8.  National Water Harvesting and Storage 
Authority 
Source: Author, 2020 
 
All the institutions that existed in the Water Act, 2002 were retained. With the exception of the 
Water Services Regulatory Board and the Water Resources Users Associations the rest were 
renamed e.g. Water Resources Management Authority is the Water Resources Authority, 
Catchment Area Advisory Committees named the Basin Water Resources Committee, the Water 
Services Boards named the Water Works Development Agency, the Water Services Trust Fund 
is the Water Sector Trust Fund and the Water Appeals Board to the Water Tribunal. The Water 
Act, 2016 further establishes one new institution, the National Water Harvesting and Storage 
Authority. Figure 4.1 and 4.2 present a diagrammatic representation of the water institutions 

















Figure 4.1 Water institutions in Water Act, 2002 
 
Source: Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MWI) (2005) 
 
Figure 4.2 Water institutions in Water Act, 2016 
 
Source: Author, 2020 
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a. Ministry of Water and Sanitation  
In the Water Act, 2002, the Ministry of Water was tasked with policy development, sector 
coordination, monitoring and supervision to ensure; equitable and effective water and sewerage 
services in the country, sustainability of water resources and development of water resources 
for irrigation, commercial, industrial, power generation and other uses. The Water Act, 2002 
empowered the Minister of Water to undertake several functions relating to the water sector 
including the formulation and review of the national water services strategy which included 
information on existing water service provision, coverage, planned expansions and investments 
in the water sector.  The Minister had powers to supply water services to consumers through the 
National Water Conservation and Pipeline Corporation (NWCPC) in situations where Water 
Service Providers (WSPs) had not been identified for supply of water to a specific area or has 
been declared to have defaulted by WASREB or in cases of emergency.  
 
In the Water Act, 2016, the Cabinet Secretary (CS) responsible for water and sanitation plays a 
critical role as was the case for the Minister under the Water Act 2002. The CS is required to 
formulate a national water resource management strategy every five years. The strategy is 
required to contain “the government’s plans and programs for the protection, conservation, 
control and management of water resources.” In addition, the CS is required to issue an annual 
report on the state of national water resources. Section 64 of the Water Act, 2016 requires the 
CS to develop a water services strategy every five years. The strategy should contain 
information relating to the existing water services, data on people not served by appropriate 
water and sanitation services, “standards for progressive realization of right to water” and 
resource mobilization strategy. The CS also has other powers such as appointment of members 
of the boards of the Water Services Regulatory Board, the Water Resources Authority and the 
Basin Committees. 
 
In addition, the Water Act, 2002 gave a prominent role to the public in the development of the 
national water strategy with the Minister having been required to consult the public on the 
content of the strategy before gazetting the final strategy. In addition, the Water Act 2002 
required not only public participation and consultations in decisions affecting them but also 
created platforms for public participation in the enhancement of service delivery in the water 
sector. The Water Action Groups (WAGs) and Water Resources Users Associations (WRUAs) 
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were created to support consumers to organize themselves in order to increase public 
participation in the decision-making process. Similarly, the Water Act 2016 embodies the 
constitutional requirement for public participation in decision-making processes for the water 
sector by requiring public consultations in the development of water resources management 
strategy and the water services strategy and retaining the use of the Water Resources Users 
Associations.   
 
b. Water Resources Management Authority (WARMA) and the Water Resources 
Authority 
In the Water Act, 2002, WARMA was responsible for all aspects of water resource management. 
This included water allocation, source protection and conservation, water quality management 
and pollution control. WARMA was tasked with the implementation of policies and strategies 
relating to management of water resources and the development of catchment level management 
strategies. The Authority was required to work with stakeholders and the general public in 
developing a water resource management strategy. Within the country-wide network of the 
Authority, catchment area committees were created to advice on water resources conservation, 
use and apportionment, adjustment of grants, and cancellation or variation of water permits. The 
establishment and operation of water users’ associations was encouraged and facilitated as fora 
for conflict resolution and co-operative management of water resources in catchment areas.  
 
Table 4.2 classifies the authority’s roles as envisioned in the Water Act, 2002, into political, 
economic, social and environmental based on the role and what the authority is required to 











Table 4.2 Water Resources Management Authority roles in the Water Act, 2002 




permits for water use.  
This was subject to; 
public consultation, 
the likely effect of the 
proposed water use on 
the water resource and 
on other water users, 
giving domestic water 
use precedence over 
the use of water for 
any other purpose, 
reasonable and 
beneficial use in 
relation to other users 
and the quality of 
water in the water 
resource which may 

















strategy and the 
resource quality 





permits for water use. 
In the determination 
WARMA was meant to 
consider; efficient and 
beneficial use of water 
in the public interest, 
the investments already 
made and to be made 
by the water user in 
respect of the water use 
in question, the 
strategic importance of 
the proposed water use, 
reasonable and 
beneficial nature and 
degree of water use in 
relation to others who 
use same sources of 
supply or bodies of 
water and the probable 
duration of the activity 
or undertaking for 






permits for water use. 
In the determination 
WARMA was meant 
to consider; the likely 
effect of the proposed 
water use on the 
water resource and 
the probable duration 
of the activity or 
undertaking for which 




conditions attached to 
permits for water use. 
WARMA was to 
change or discontinue 
the permit in the event 
of inequity or shortage 
for domestic use. 
Monitoring, and 








conditions attached to 
permits for water use. 
WARMA could 
change permit in the 
event of inequity or 
shortage of water for 
any other purpose that 
should have priority. 
Monitoring and 
enforcing the 
conditions attached to 
permits for water use. 
Environmental 
Impact Assessment 
was to be done and 
permit changed in the 
event of deterioration 
of quality of water.  
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Social roles Political roles Economic roles Environmental roles 
Appointing such 
officers and other staff 
as may be necessary 
for the exercise and 
performance of its 
powers and functions.  
Human resources 
included the Chair of 
the board in addition 
to ten members who 
were given the power 
to recruit the CEO, 
chief officers and 











Determining charges to 
be imposed for the use 
of water from any 
water resource in 
accordance with 







from adverse impacts 
including 
conservation of 
ground water with 
public consultation. 
 
 Liaising with 





The Authority, with the 
approval of the 
Minister and the 
Treasury, could retain 
in a fund managed by it 
some or all of the 
revenue from water use 
charges payable under 
a permit, to be applied 
by the Authority in 
meeting costs incurred 






protected areas to be 
gazzetted. 







Source: Author, 2020 
 
 
Section 11 of the Water Act, 2016 retains WARMA, but renames it Water Resources Authority. 
The Authority is mandated to regulate management and use of water resources. It also has a 
coordinating role with power to coordinate with regional, national and international bodies in 
management and use of water resources. In addition, the Authority is the regulatory institution 
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on use and management of water resources empowered to enforce regulations and issue permits 
for use of water resources. Table 4.3 classifies each of the authority’s roles into political, 
economic, social and environmental based on the role and what the authority is required to 
consider in executing each role as envisioned in the Water Act, 2016. 
 
Table 4.3 Water Resources Authority roles in the Water Act, 2016 
Social roles Political roles Economic roles Environmental roles 
Regulating the 
management and use 




regulations for the 
management and use 
of water resources 
and flood mitigation.  
Regulating the 
management and 
use of water 
resources.  
Regulating the 
management and use of 
water resources.   
Declare catchment 
areas as a protected 
area. Impose such 
requirements or 
regulate or prohibit 
such conduct or 
activities, in or in 
relation to the protected 
catchment area 
considered necessary 
for the protection of the 






use and recharge. 
Determining, issuing 
and varying water 
permits. Enforcing 




advice to the Cabinet 
Secretary for 
formulation of 
policy on national 
water resource 
management, water 











the conditions of 
those permits. 
Receiving water permit 
applications for water 
abstraction, water use 
and recharge. 
Determining, issuing 
and varying water 
permits. Enforcing the 
conditions of those 
permits. 
Appointing such 
officers and other 
staff as may be 
necessary for the 
exercise and 







for the better 
regulation of the 
management and use 
of water resources. 
Collecting water 
permit fees and 
water use charges. 
Determining and 
setting permit and 
water use fees. 
Coordinating with other 
regional, national and 
international bodies for 
the better regulation of 
the management and 
use of water resources. 
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Cabinet Secretary on 
management and 
uses of water 
resources. 
  
The Authority shall 
prescribe the criteria 
for classifying water 




objectives for each 
class of water 
resource.  
The Authority shall 
prescribe the criteria 
for classifying water 




objectives for each 
class of water 
resource.  
The Authority 
shall prescribe the 
criteria for 
classifying water 




objectives for each 




criteria shall take 
into account 
strategic functions 
served by the 
water resource. 
The Authority shall 
prescribe the criteria for 
classifying water 
resources for the 
purpose of determining 
water resources quality 
objectives for each 
class of water resource. 
This entails considering 
ecological functions of 
the water resource and 
vulnerability to 
degradation or 
depletion and other 
related factors.  




Source: Author, 2020 
 
A number of changes can be seen in the roles of the Authority between the 2002 and 2016 Act. 
There is an expansion of the scope of permits i.e. permits given by the authority do not only 
cover water use as envisioned in the Water Act, 2002 but include water abstraction and recharge 
in the Water Act, 2016. In addition, the formulation and enforcement of standards, procedures 
and regulations for the management and use of water resources have been expanded in the Water 
Act, 2016 to include flood mitigation which was not covered in the Water Act, 2002.  
 
In the Water Act, 2016, the authority no longer has the role of monitoring and re-assessing the 
national water resources management strategy which is now assigned to the Cabinet Secretary 
in charge of water and sanitation. In line with this, WRA is now allocated the role of providing 
information and advice to the Cabinet Secretary for formulation of policy on national water 




The Water Act, 2016 caters for water resource management at the County level. Sections 24 to 
26 of the Water Act, 2016, provides for the creation of Basin Water Resources Committee 
(Basin Committee) where counties are represented. It is within the context of the work of the 
Basin Committee that counties discharge their resource management functions. The Basin 
Committees are appointed by the Cabinet Secretary and shall be responsible for the management 
of water resources in their basin areas, which shall be defined by the Cabinet Secretary. The 
Basin committees are required to develop a “basin area water resources management strategy” 
containing the strategy for allocation, management and protection of water resources in the 
respective basin area. The Basin Committees might also contract water user associations to 
perform functions relating to water resource management. 
 
The authority has the key role of coordinating with other regional, national and international 
bodies for the better regulation of the management and use of water resources and maintain a 
national monitoring and geo referenced information system on water resources.  
 
Water Act, 2002 gave WARMA the powers to “undertake the prosecution of any offences 
arising under the Act or in connection with the performance of its functions”. Section 12 (a) of 
the Water Act, 2016 under the function of WRA states that it shall “formulate and enforce 
standards, procedures and Regulations for the management and use of water resources and flood 
mitigation”. Section 12 (c) further states that the Authority shall enforce regulations made under 
this Act and 12 (d) states that it will “receive water permit applications for water abstraction, 
water use and recharge and determine, issue, vary water permits; and enforce the conditions of 
those permits”. In the enforcement mechanism the Water Act, 2016 provides for prosecution. 
The Water Act, 2016 states that “Without prejudice to the rights of any person to bring 
proceedings in respect of an offence under this Act, and subject to Article 157 of the 
Constitution, the Authority, the Regulatory Board, a county government executive or a licensee 
may institute and maintain criminal proceedings in any court against any person accused of an 
offence under this Act or under any Regulations or Regulations made under this Act”.  
 
WARMA has an accountability role that require it to; keep all proper books and records of 
account of the income, expenditure, assets and liabilities and prepare an annual report of its 
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work and activities within 3 months after the end of each financial year. On payment of the 
prescribed fee, any member of the public can have access to information contained in any 
national information system and shall be supplied with a copy of the Authority’s annual report. 
 
c. Water Services Regulatory Board  
The Water Act, 2002, established the Water Services Regulatory Board (WASREB) which was 
responsible for the regulation of water and sewerage services including licensing, quality 
assurance, and issuance of guidelines for tariffs and prices and dispute resolution. WASREB 
was further tasked with overseeing the implementation of policies and strategies relating to 
provision of water services and approving and issuing licenses to appointed water service 
providers, determining water standards and monitoring water quality, developing standards and 
guiding on cost effective management of water service provision including tariff setting and 
monitoring the performance of water services boards and water service providers. 
 
WASREB was also empowered under the law to prosecute offences arising under the law 
relating to its functions. One of the more important functions by WASREB was maintenance of 
a national monitoring and information system on water services. In this role WASREB oversees 
a system for collection and management of data regarding water services. To implement this, 
WASREB was empowered to request necessary information regarding water services from any 
person within a reasonable time. Table 4.4 classifies WASREB’s specific roles into political, 














Table 4.4 Water Services Regulatory Board’s roles in the Water Act, 2002 
Social roles Political roles Economic roles Environmental 
roles 
Determining 
standards for the 
provision of water 
services to 
consumers. 
Liaising with other 




Issuing licenses for the 
provision of water 
services and ensuring 
that the WSPs have 
technical and financial 
capacity, performance 
targets and a plan for 
provision of affordable 




















standards for the design, 
construction, operation 
and maintenance of 









facilities for water. 
Monitoring, and 

















for the fixing of tariffs 




guidelines for the 
fixing of tariffs for 
the provision of 
water services 
 Developing guidelines 
for and advising on the 
cost-effective and 
efficient management 




on procedures for 
dealing with 
complaints from 
consumers and to 
monitor the 
operation of these 
procedures. 
 Monitoring the operation 
of agreements between 
water services boards and 
water service providers 
and to take appropriate 









regulations for the 
provision of water 






Determining fees, levies, 
premiums and other 
charges to be imposed for 
water services in 
accordance with the 
national water services 
strategy. 
WASREB, with the 
approval of the Minister 
and the Treasury can 
retain in a fund managed 
by it some or all of the 
revenue from license 
fees, to be applied by the 
Regulatory Board in 
meeting costs incurred in 






 Developing model 
performance agreements 
for use between licensees 




including the board, 
CEO, principal 
officers, officers and 
other staff. 
   
Source: Author, 2020 
 
Section 70 of the Water Act, 2016 establishes the Water Services Regulatory Board with the 
role of protecting “the interest and rights of consumers in the provision of water services.” 
Section 72 sets out the regulatory functions of the board which include the formulation and 
monitoring of national standards for water service provision, recommending and approval of 
water tariffs, licensing and monitoring of water service providers, consumer complaint and 
monitoring of implementation of the water services strategy. Table 4.5 classifies each of the 
Regulatory Board’s roles into political, economic, social and environmental as envisioned in the 





Table 4.5 Water Services Regulatory Board’s roles in the Water Act, 2016 
Social roles Political roles Economic roles Environmental roles 
Monitoring and 
regulating licensees 





standards for the 
provision of water 






water and sewerage 




imposition of such 













regarding the quality 
or nature of water 
services. 
Advising the Cabinet 
Secretary on the 
nature, extent and 
conditions of 
financial support to 
be accorded to water 














facilities for the 
provision of water.  
Developing guidelines 
on the establishment 
of consumer groups 
and facilitating their 
establishment. 
Monitoring progress 
in the implementation 
of the water Strategy 





license conditions  
Inspecting water 
works and water 
services to ensure that 
such works and 




how to provide basic 
water services to 
marginalized areas. 
Advising the Cabinet 
Secretary on any 
matter in connection 





association to be 
used by all water 
companies 
applying to be 
licensed by the 
Regulatory Board 
to operate as water 
services providers.  
 
Maintaining a 
national database and 
information system on 
water services. 
Maintaining a 
national database and 
information system 
on water services. 
 
Making regulations 









Social roles Political roles Economic roles Environmental roles 
Reporting annually to 
the public on issues of 
water supply and 
sewerage services and 
the performance of 
relevant sectors and 
publishing the reports 
in the Gazette. 
Reporting annually to 
the public on issues 
of water supply and 
sewerage services 
and the performance 
of relevant sectors 
and publishing the 
reports in the Gazette 
Inspecting water 
works and water 
services to ensure 
that such works 






and sewerage tariffs 
to the county water 
services providers and 
approving the 
imposition of such 
tariffs in line with 
consumer protection 
standards 
   
Source: Author, 2020 
 
As opposed to the Water Act, 2002, in addition to determining standards for the provision of 
water services to consumers, the Water Act, 2016 has expanded the role of the Board to include 
determining and prescribing national standards for asset development for water service 
providers. This is a role not initially envisioned in the Water Act, 2002. Even though WASREB 
was tasked with monitoring compliance with established standards for the design, construction, 
operation and maintenance of facilities for water services it was not clear who established them. 
This monitoring role further prescribes the scope of WASREB’s monitoring of compliance with 
established standards for the design, construction, operation and maintenance of facilities for 
water services to WWDA’s and WSPs as opposed to the Water Act of 2002 which was not 
specific on the institutions. 
 
The role of liaising with other bodies for the better regulation and management of water services 
and promotion of water conservation and demand management measures envisioned in the 
Water Act, 2002 is not allocated in the Water Act, 2016. The Act, however, provides for the 
regulatory board to work with the county governments in enforcing certain regulatory 
requirements including terms of service provision by the WSPs. In this regard, the regulatory 
board may consult the county government in imposing special regulatory regime on a licensee 
who contravenes requirements of license. County governments also have a general obligation 
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“to monitor and enforce” applicable regulations developed under the Act. Where failure is noted, 
the regulatory board may make such orders to the county government executive concerned, to 
take required action. County governments also have the power, after consultation with the 
regulatory board, to reduce, dispense with regulations that the county government considers 
“unreasonable” in a particular case. 
 
In the Water Act, 2016 a number of new roles are introduced including; providing 
recommendations on how to provide basic water services to marginalized areas; developing 
guidelines on the establishment of consumer groups and facilitating their establishment; 
advising the Cabinet Secretary on the nature, extent and conditions of financial support to be 
accorded to water services providers for providing water services and monitoring progress in 
the implementation of the water strategy and making appropriate recommendations. 
 
A major shift in the Board’s roles is the direct responsibility of the water service providers 
(WSPs) as opposed to the Water Act, 2002 where they were under the Water Services Board. 
The Water Act 2016 continues with the use of private WSPs to implement actual water and 
sanitation service provision. However, applications for licensing of the WSPs is to be made to 
the regulatory board with a copy of application submitted to county government of the area the 
WSP intends to serve. The law requires the regulatory board to take into consideration the views 
of stakeholders including the county governments, however, the county governments are not 
provided the powers to veto the licensing. In addition, whereas section 77 provides for the 
establishment of WSPs by the county governments, the decision on the numbers of the WSPs 
to operate and jurisdiction of supply area, is determined solely by the regulatory board.  
 
The regulatory board is also required to develop guidelines to regulate the conduct of the WSPs. 
Where the WSP breaches the guidelines, ceases to meet criteria set for licensing, becomes 
insolvent, fails to provide services or comply with the conditions of licensing, the regulatory 
board may suspend or revoke such the license of the WSP concerned. The regulatory board will 
define the area within which the WSPs will provide water services. However, the law requires 
the regulatory board to consider commercial viability and shall not prescribe to a WSP an area 
less than required for commercial viability. In addition, the regulatory board may permit 
clustering of WSPs to provide water services within a specified area with a view to improving 
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efficiency and commercial viability. In this regard, the regulatory board may order joint service 
provision or transfer of water service license with a view to securing commercial viability. 
Further, whereas an ideal scenario would limit the area of operation for WSP to the boundary 
of a county, a license granted to WSP may cover more than one county. Where a WSP 
contravenes license requirements, a special license regime may be imposed or transfer function 
of water service provision to another license holder. 
 
Under the function assigned to WASREB, the Water Act, 2016 requires public consultation in 
the development of guidelines and regulatory standards, appointment of WSPs, applications for 
licenses. The general public also enjoys the right to information regarding the water service 
provision whereby details of WSP are to be made available to the public for purposes of scrutiny. 
WSPs intending to restrict water supply are also required to place details of such restriction in 
the local media. 
 
Water Act, 2002 gave WASREB the powers to “undertake the prosecution of any offences 
arising under the Act or in connection with the performance of its functions”. Similarly, the 
Water Act, 2016 states that “Without prejudice to the rights of any person to bring proceedings 
in respect of an offence under this Act, and subject to Article 157 of the Constitution, the 
Authority, the Regulatory Board, a county government executive or a licensee may institute and 
maintain criminal proceedings in any court against any person accused of an offence under this 
Act or under any Regulations or Regulations made under this Act”.  
 
WASREB has a number of accountability roles. It is expected to keep all proper books and 
records of account of the income, expenditure, assets and liabilities and is required to prepare 
an annual report of its work and activities within three months after the end of each financial 
year. On payment of the prescribed fee, any member of the public can have access to information 
contained in any national database and information system and shall be supplied with a copy of 
the Board’s annual report. 
 
d. Water Services Boards (WSB) and Water Works Development Agency 
In the Water Act, 2002, the Water Services Boards (WSBs) were responsible for the efficient 
and economical provision of water and sewerage services within their area of jurisdiction in 
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accordance with the national water services strategy and under the regulation of the Regulatory 
Board. WSBs were responsible for planning for improvement in provision of water supply and 
sewerage services, appointment and contracting water service providers and an asset holder of 
central government facilities. 
 
The responsibility of providing water and sanitation services was vested in the WSBs. The 
WSBs were established by the Minister and licensed by WASREB. The WSBs were tasked with 
the responsibility of developing water systems in their areas of jurisdiction and supplying water 
and sanitation services. However, section 53 as read with section 55 requires the WSBs not to 
provide water services directly, but through “the licence by one or more agents, to be known as 
water service providers” in the area jurisdiction of the respective WSBs after appropriate 
licensing from WASREB.  
 
Section 55 of the Water Act, 2002 requires that the arrangement between the WSBs and the 
WSPs be in writing, which is referred to as Service Provision Agreements. Technically, the 
WSB might enter into an agreement with one or more suppliers in respect of the area of supply 
or may also assist WSPs within a specified territory. The WSPs could have been community 
groups, Non-Governmental Organizations, or autonomous entities established by local 
authorities or other persons. All WSPs were required by law to get approvals to provide water 
and sanitation services in the area of jurisdiction of the WSB, before being formally licensed to 
provide the service. Since legally, the WSBs had the mandate of providing water services, the 
WSPs were to enter into a licensing agreement with the WSBs determine the scope of services 
and where applicable define the territory or area of service provision. In turn, the WSPs would 
pay annual license fees and lease fees for using infrastructure of the WSBs. Since the WSBs 
mandate is providing water services to consumers, their roles focus more on the social and 









Table 4.6 Water Services Board’s roles in the Water Act, 2002 
Social roles Economic roles 
Staffing provisions including 
the Board, CEO appointed by 
the Board and officers and 
other staff. 
Responsible for the efficient and economical provision of 
water services. 
 
 Provision of Water services in circumstances where the 
Regulatory Board is satisfied that the procurement of such 
an agent is not possible or that the provision of such 
services by an agent is not practicable. 
 For the purpose of the provision of water services; 
purchase, lease or otherwise acquire, on such terms as the 
Minister may approve, premises, plant, equipment and 
facilities or land 
Source: Author, 2020 
 
Section 65 of the Water Act, 2016 empowers the Cabinet Secretary to establish one or more 
“waterworks development agencies and define geographical area of jurisdiction for each such 
agency”. Each agency is a body corporate with an independent board and management. As a 
result the following eight WWDAs were formed; Athi Water Works Development Agency, 
Coast Water Works Development Agency, Lake Victoria North Water Works Development 
Agency, Lake Victoria South Water Works Development Agency, Northern Water Works 
Development Agency, Rift Valley Water Works Development Agency, Tana Water Works 
Development Agency and the Tanathi Water Works Development Agency. Although section 67 
requires the CS to consult with stakeholders in development of criteria for establishment of the 
Water Works Development Agencies, it is the prerogative of the Cabinet Secretary. 
 
The functions of the agencies as provided in section 68 of the Water Act, 2016 include the 
“development, maintenance and management of national public water works” a function similar 
to that contemplated to be undertaken by the National Water Harvesting and Storage Authority 
under section 8 “undertake on behalf of the national government, the development of national 
public water works for water resources storage and flood control”.  
 
In addition, the agencies are empowered to operate water works and “provide water services as 
a water service provider until such a time as responsibility for the operation and management of 
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the water works are handed over to a county government, joint committee, and authority of 
county governments or water service provider”. In terms of water service provision, the agencies 
are to provide “reserve capacity for purposes of providing water services” in situations where a 
license of an existing WSP is withdrawn and functions yet to be transferred to another WSP. 
Table 4.7 summarised the roles of the Water Works Development Agency. 
 
Table 4.7 Water Works Development Agency roles in the Water Act, 2016 
Social roles Political roles Economic roles Environmental 
roles 
Providing reserve 
capacity for purposes 
of providing water 
services where 
WASREB orders the 
transfer of water 
services functions 
from a defaulting 






in the discharge 
of his or her 
functions under 
the Constitution 
and this Act. 
Operating the 
waterworks and provide 
water services as a water 
service provider, until 
such a time as 
responsibility for the 
operation and 
management of the 
waterworks are handed 
over to a county 
government, joint 
committee, authority of 
county governments or 




management of the 
national public 
water works within 
its area of 
jurisdiction.  
Providing technical 
services and capacity 
building to such 
county governments 
and water services 
providers as may be 
requested. 
 Undertaking the 
development, 
maintenance and 
management of the 
national public water 






services as a water 
service provider, 
until such a time as 
responsibility for the 
operation and 
management of the 
waterworks are 
handed over. 
   




The Water Services Boards had a major shift in their functions or mandate. While in the Water 
Act, 2002 Water Services Providers were agents of the Water Services Regulatory Boards and 
the Water Services Board were responsible for the efficient and economical provision of water 
services authorised by the licence, this role is not assigned to the Water Works Development 
Agencies since in the Act of 2016 as it was shifted to WASREB.   
 
The Water Works Development Agencies are also assigned the role of; providing technical 
services and capacity building to such county governments and water services providers within 
its area as may be requested; and providing to the Cabinet Secretary technical support in the 
discharge of his or her functions under the Constitution and this Act. These roles did not apply 
to the Water Services Boards or any other agency in the Water Act, 2002. 
 
In both Acts, however, the Water Services Boards and the Water Works Development Agencies 
can provide water services in cases where a WSP is not identified.  
 
e. Water Services Trust Fund and Water Sector Trust Fund 
The Water Act 2002 established a fund known as the Water Services Trust Fund (WSTF) 
managed by trustees appointed by the Minister. The Water Services Trust Fund (WSTF) was 
responsible for assisting in financing the provision of water services to areas without adequate 
water services or are inadequately provided for. It was established under the law with a view to 
encourage provision of resources and financing for development of water infrastructure largely 
to rural areas that were not attractive for private sector investment due to non-commercial 
viability of the areas. The fund consists of funds allocated by parliament, donations, grants and 
other monies payable to the fund. Table 4.8 classifies WSTF’s specific roles into political, 










Table 4.8 Water Services Trust Fund roles in the Water Act, 2002 
Social roles Political roles Economic roles 
The Fund was to be 
managed by trustees 
from time to time 
appointed and holding 
office under a trust 
deed, to be drawn up 
by the Minister.  
 
The trustees developed 
and applied principles 
governing the grant of 
moneys from the Fund 
and for achieving the 
object of the Fund. 
Assist in financing the provision of 
water services to areas of Kenya which 
are without adequate water services.  
The fund held; such moneys as were 
appropriated by parliament for the 
purposes of the Fund; such moneys as 
were received by the Fund from 
donations, grants, and bequests from 
whatever source; and such other moneys 
as were, by or under any Act, payable to 
the Fund. 
Source: Author, 2020 
 
Section 113 of the Water Act, 2016 retained the fund as the Water Sector Trust Fund (WSTF). 
The object of the Fund is to provide conditional and unconditional grants to counties, in addition 
to the Equalisation Fund and to assist in financing the development and management of water 
services in marginalized areas or any area which is considered by the Board of Trustees to be 
underserved including; community level initiatives for the sustainable management of water 
resources; development of water services in rural areas considered not to be commercially viable 
for provision of water services by licensees; development of water services in the under-served 
poor urban areas; and research activities in the area of water resources management and water 
services, sewerage and sanitation. Table 4.9 classifies its roles into economic, social, political 













Table 4.9 Water Sector Trust Fund roles in the Water Act, 2016 
Social roles Political roles Economic roles Environmental roles 
Implementing 
measures to ensure the 
efficient and equitable 
sharing of the resources 
of the fund giving 
priority to resource 
allocation in; rural and 
urban areas where 
access to basic water 
services is below the 
national average; and 
rural areas which are 
vulnerable to the 
degradation or 














and effectiveness of 
funds. 
Managing the 










measures to ensure 
the efficient and 
equitable sharing of 















on the projects 





information on the 
projects financed 




subsidiary funds as 
may be necessary 
for sustainable 
financing towards 




  Receiving grants 
for onward lending 




water services and 
water resources 
management 
projects for the 
underserved areas 
and urban poor. 
 
Source: Author, 2020 
In the Water Act, 2016 the WSTF has powers to implement the funds under its control including 
through onward lending to WSP, “water resource management projects” and county 
governments. As such, it is not mandatory for the WSTF to channel funds under its control to 
the county governments only. Section 117 describing sources of the fund include funding 
allocated by parliament “from the national budget”.  
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f. Water Appeals Board and the Water Tribunal 
Section 84 of the Water Act 2002 established a Water Appeals Board. The Water Appeals Board 
was responsible for the determination of appeals and disputes and adjudicating disputes between 
sector players. Its decision was to be final, except where an appeal would lie in the High Court. 
An appeal would lie to the Water Appeals Board at the suit of any person having a right or 
proprietary interest which is directly affected by a decision or order of the Authority, the 
Minister or the Regulatory Board concerning a permit or license under this Act, and the Board 
shall hear and determine any such appeal. The roles of the Appeals Board cut across the political 
social, economic and environment roles since it determines matters that cut across these roles.  
Section 119 of the Water Act, 2016 established a Water Tribunal. The Tribunal shall hear and 
determine appeals at the instance of any person or institution directly affected by the decision 
or order of the Cabinet Secretary, the Authority and Regulatory Board or of any person acting 
under their authority.  
 
The Tribunal has also general powers of dispute resolution regarding disputes “concerning water 
resources or water services”. As such, the functions of the Tribunal are broader than those 
assigned to the Water Appeals Board under the Water Act 2002. The Tribunal also serves under 
the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) and not under the Ministry of Water and Sanitation like 
the Water Appeals Board under the Water Act, 2002. 
 
g. National Water Harvesting and Storage Authority 
Section 30 of the Water Act, 2016 established the National Water Harvesting and Storage 
Authority. The function of the Storage Authority are; to undertake the development, 
management and maintenance of national public works for water resources storage and flood 
control; maintain and manage national public water works infrastructure for water resources 
storage and develop a water harvesting policy and enforce water harvesting strategies. It is also 
tasked with the collection and provision of information for the formulation by the Cabinet 
Secretary of the national water resources storage and flood control strategies; undertaking on 
behalf of the national government strategic water emergency interventions during drought; and 
advising the Cabinet Secretary on any matter concerning national public water works for water 
storage and flood control. Table 4.10 classifies the Authority’s specific roles into political, 
economic, social and environmental.  
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Table 4.10 National Water Harvesting and Storage Authority roles in the Water Act, 2016 
Social roles Political roles Economic roles Environmental roles 
Undertaking on behalf 














national public water 
works for water 
resources storage 
and flood control. 
Undertaking on 






provisions for the 
Authority i.e. Board 
whose chair is 
appointed by the 
president, a CEO 
appointed by the 
Cabinet secretary, 




on any matter 
concerning national 
public water works 
for water storage 
and flood control.  
Maintaining and 
managing national 





 Collect and provide 
information for the 
formulation by the 
Cabinet Secretary 
of the national 
water resources 
storage and flood 
control strategies 
  
Source: Author, 2020 
 
4.3 Gaps in the regulatory framework in the water sector 
a. Regulatory gap 
The Water Act, 2016 establishes two regulatory organizations, WRA and WASREB, it however 
fails to clearly outline how the Water Works Development Agencies and the National Water 
Harvesting and Storage Authority will be regulated under this framework. These being 
institutions that are responsible for development of national water works, this gap in their 
regulation could be problematic.    
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“The Water Works Development Agencies develop assets but are not under regulation 
by WASREB or WRA. This creates a challenge in ensuring the quality of water 
services.” WASREB Official. 
 
A WASREB official further indicated that in some instances the National Water Harvesting and 
Storage Authority think that they can supply water in bulk. This is, however, prohibited by 
section 100 (1) which states that “a person shall not supply water in bulk to a water services 
provider without a licence issued by the Regulatory Board.”  
 
b. Overlapping roles 
There exist potential overlaps between the roles of the WWDAs and Water Harvesting and 
Storage Authority in terms of development of national public works.  Each WWDA is mandated 
to “undertake the development, maintenance and management of the national public water 
works within its area of jurisdiction” and the Harvesting Authority has the mandate to 
“undertake on behalf of the national government, the development of national public water 
works for water resources storage and flood control”. The Water Act, 2016 fails to clearly 
articulate how these two institutions will collaborate or complement each other’s roles to ensure 
the seamless execution of their mandate.  
 
c. Collaborative roles 
The Act further fails to assign collaboration or liaising roles in various instances. In the Water 
Act, 2016, WASREB is not expressly assigned the role of liaising with other institutions in the 
execution of its mandate as was done in the Water Act, 2002 which stated that it should “liaise 
with other bodies for the better regulation and management of water services”. While there exist 
other sectors and institutions which perform functions that are relevant to the water sector and 
require collaborative efforts, the Water Act, 2016 fails to envision how these institutions will 
collaborate with those established in the Act. These include Kenya Forest Service, National 
Environmental and Management Authority and the Ministry of Environment and Forestry. With 
the exception of the Water Sector Trust Fund where the Water Act, 2016 states the Fund will be 
tasked with formulating and implementing principles, regulations and procedures in 
consultation with the national government and county governments for financing projects, 
including efficiency and effectiveness of funds, minimal collaboration is envisioned for the 




4.4 Challenges in implementing the water regulatory framework 
a. Funding challenges 
Financing remains a challenge given the scarcity of resources and competing priorities within 
the Country. One respondent indicated that under the Water Act, 2016 their mandate was 
expanded, and funding has not yet expanded to match the functions given therefore leaving them 
with funding gaps.  
“Ideally we require approximately Kenya shilling 100 billion annually, we however, 
receive about Kenya shilling 40 billion yet initially we were responsible for eight Water 
Services Boards and now we are directly licencing about ninety Water Service 
Providers.” WASREB official. 
 
A WRA official stated that “Given that financial resources are scarce and have to be 
distributed among different sectors, we have a financial shortage.” 
 
b. Regulatory Challenges 
The officials from WASREB and WRA indicated that Counties in some instances feel like there 
should be no regulation from National institutions on the service providers as they deem it an 
interference with one of the functions that has been allocated to Counties. This has presented a 
specific challenge to WASREB in the management of water service providers since in the view 
of the county governments, as per the Constitution of Kenya 2010, regulation of water services 
is a power or function that concurrently lies with county governments and the national 
government. Alternatively, Counties have argued that it is not prudent to have authority to 
provide a specific service without the attendant power of regulation suggesting that they should 
regulate service providers.  
 
c. Coordination Challenges 
Water service providers in some instances due to a number of institutions at the National level 
are subjected to a number of levies e.g. from WASREB and the National Environmental 
Management Authority (NEMA). These levies present a challenge in the setting of tariffs as 
they result in a rise in the cost of provision of services hence impacting on the charges translated 
to water users.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSIONS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
This chapter discusses the findings of the study, outlines the conclusions and presents the 
recommendations. 
 
5.1 Discussion of the findings 
This section discusses the regulatory framework, institutional roles and how they have evolved 
between 2002 and 2017, gaps in Kenya’s water sector institutional and regulatory Framework 
and the challenges experienced by the institutions in implementing the mandates in the 
regulatory framework. 
 
5.1.1 Water sector regulatory framework 
The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 reorganised a number of government functions based on the 
establishment of two levels of governments with separate functions which required cooperation 
and interdependence in service deliver. The fourth schedule of the constitution distributed 
functions between the National government and the County governments. With respect to the 
water sector, the responsibility of supply of water and sanitation was assigned to the county 
governments.  
 
The constitution required the transfer of functions from the hitherto centralized government 
structure to the county governments where such functions were allocated to the county 
governments. This was required to be followed by movement and allocation of resources to the 
county governments to undertake the functions. This distribution of functions ensures that each 
level of government is clear on the functions that they are responsible for and therefore prevents 
potential clashes in the execution of their functions which may result in inefficiencies in water 
service provision and water resource management.  
 
The Constitution led to the revision of the Water Act of 2002 to align it with the provisions in 
the constitution. This according to Saleth and Dinar (2000) is an exogenous drive. It differs 
from; the United States of America water policy which changed due to highly fragmented policy 
making environment with multiple agencies that had resulted in an increasingly volatile and 
highly contested water landscape (Gerlak, 2006), and the European Union where it was due to 
the increasing complexity of water resource management, the increasing number of actors and 
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institutions involved in the process and the newly vested economic interests in water supply 
(Kaika, 2003). It however can be likened to Mexico’s scenario where Saleth and Dinar (2000) 
found that water sector changes was towards decentralization and privatization initiatives.  
 
In the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, water is recognized as a human right in line with the United 
Nations General Assembly declaration of safe and clean water and sanitation a human right 
essential for the full enjoyment of life and all other human rights (United Nations General 
Assembly, 2010). This recognition ensures that countries work towards ensuring that their 
populations have access to water required for human survival. The social aspect of water 
governance as envisioned by Camkin and Neto (2016) should cater for recognition of water as 
a human right as done in the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 
 
Further, water is held in trust by the National Government. This aids in ensuring that equity is 
maintained, and a locality or community does not get advantage over others in terms of access 
given their proximity to the water body or its existence in a particular County Government’s 
jurisdiction. This is in line with Jacobi, De Stefano, López-Gunn, Solanes, Delacámara, Marín, 
Embid, Empinotti, Blanco, Donoso, Rica, Uribe and Jiménez (2014) who stated that in most 
legal systems, water belongs to the public domain of the State with it having public ownership 
and control.  
 
Governing water includes; the formulation, establishment and implementation of water policies, 
legislation and institutions, and clarification of the roles and responsibilities of government, civil 
society and the private sector in relation to water resources and services (UNDP-SIWI Water 
Governance Facility , 2016). The Water Act, 2016 is the instrument that provides for 
management, conservation, use and control of water resource in Kenya after repealing the Water 
Act, 2002. Similarly, in Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR) the Water and Water 
Resources Law, 1996 is the primary law concerned with water resources management in Lao 
PDR and it focuses on the protection of water resources, water resource planning and prevention 
of water pollution. Similarly, in Vietnam, the Law on Water Resources (LWR) provides the 
basis for establishing the basic policies, principles and framework for the planning, exploitation, 
utilization, conservation, protection, regulation and management of all water resources for 
comprehensive, integrated and sustainable development. It also prescribes the administrative 
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authority and responsibility to implement this Law, including the cooperation, communication 
and coordination of the various ministries and agencies of the government, provinces, water 
users and the public (Turner, Pangare, & Mather, 2009). 
 
Under the Water Act, 2016 the water governance framework can be categorized into resource 
management, service provision, financing and dispute resolution based on the institutions 
created. This spectrum caters for the management of the resource, its harvesting and storage, its 
delivery to the various users both domestic and commercial, the financing of operations of these 
aspects and the resolutions of dispute that arise anywhere along this spectrum. This is similar 
to; Cambodia where different government agencies are responsible for the provision, 
management and regulation of water supply and in Lao PDR where there exists bodies for sector 
administration, Water Supply Authority’s Regulatory Board, financing of sector operations and 
cost recovery and utility operation (Turner, Pangare, & Mather, 2009). 
 
Further, the Acts assign roles on management of water resources and water services 
management to separate institutions. This is in line with what Solanes and Jouravev (2006) who 
state that in order to avoid problems, many jurisdictions assign responsibilities for policy 
formulation, water allocation, and programme and project evaluation to an agency that does not 
have responsibilities for the use of the resource.  
 
The public interest theory, while not directly having driven the change from the Water Act, 2002 
to the Water Act, 2016, can be seen in terms of the both water acts putting in place measures for 
efficiency in water service provision by ensuring it establishes relevant institutions and relevant 
regulatory mechanisms. It also makes use of private water service providers to ensure efficiency 
in water service provision. The theory states that efficient regulatory institutions are a key 
element of public interest (Den Hertog, 2010). The public participation envisioned for the 
Cabinet Secretary, Water Resources Authority and Water Services Regulatory Board can be 
viewed as a method for ensuring that the public interest is translated into political processes in 
form of strategy and policy formulation. This negates what Den Hertog (1999) stated in the 
public interest theory which “fails to predict how the public interest is translated through 
political institutions into a decision, who will be regulated and who will receive the benefits or 
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bear the costs, or the form of the regulation”. The water Acts state the institutions that will be 
regulated, and the costs are born by taxpayers and water users.  
 
In both water acts, regulation of the water resource has been assigned to the Water Resources 
Authority and regulation of water services to the Water Services Regulatory Board. This is in 
line with the theory which proposes that regulatory responsibility be assigned to the government 
(Den Hertog, 2010). The Water Act, 2016 states that “Every water resource is vested in and held 
by the national government in trust for the people of Kenya.” This is in line with the public 
interest theory which is based on the premise that the ideal political community is that in which 
property is owned in common and serves a common interest as envisioned by Plato (Den Hertog, 
2010).  
 
5.1.2 Water Sector Institutions from 2002 to 2017  
a. Ministry of Water and Sanitation 
Gerlak (2006) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2005) note 
that it is important to have a leading and coordination body given complexity and the number 
of stakeholders in the water sector. The Water Act, 2002 and Water Act, 2016 both provided for 
an overarching body through the Ministry of Water and Sanitation to ensure that water 
management was or is planned for and coordinated, and services delivered. This is in line with 
a number of countries that have an overall water governance institution e.g. in Cambodia the 
establishment of the Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology which is the lead water 
sector agency tasked with providing sustainable and pro-poor management of water resources, 
water management facilities, water-related hazards, and land resources that is integrated, 
efficient, and carried out in a river basin context (Turner, Pangare, & Mather, 2009).  
 
In addition, the CS in his or her capacity is responsible for the development of the water resource 
management strategy and the water services strategy as opposed to the Water Act, 2002 where 
the Ministry had the responsibility of the water services strategy with the water resource 
management strategy left to the Water Resources Management Authority. In the Water Act, 
2016 therefore, strategy formulation purely lies with the Ministry. This ensures that the country 
has a plan for water resources and services that sets direction for all actors and institutions in 
the development and management of water resources and services. This is crucial in any 
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governance system to avoid a scenario where the same institution develops a strategy and has 
to implement it therefore resulting in a conflict of interest or lack of an overall framework.    
 
Aside from the Ministry of Water and Sanitation and institutions created under the Water Act 
2002 and Water Act, 2016, a number of other ministries and government agencies play different 
roles in the water sector. Coordination among these institutions is therefore crucial so as to 
ensure seamless delivery of service and management of the water resource. These are however 
not catered for in terms of creating coordinating mechanisms to ensure water as a resource is 
utilized efficiently. These include the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, Ministry of Health, 
Ministry of agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries and the Ministry of Energy. This differs from 
Cambodia which has a Sector Coordinating Committee for the Development of Water Supply 
and Sanitation that is chaired by the Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy. The Committee 
includes eleven other institutions such as Ministry of Rural Development, Ministry of Public 
Works and Transport, Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology, Ministry of Health, 
Ministry of Environment, Council of Ministers, Commune Development Council, Ministry of 
Economy and Finance, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Phnom Penh Water 
Supply Authority and the Ministry of Planning (Turner, Pangare, & Mather, 2009). 
 
The Political aspect as envisioned by the WGF (UNDP-SIWI Water Governance Facility , 2016) 
entails equal right for all water stakeholders to take part in the decision making process. The 
government’s responsibilities include ensuring that long-term water policies and plans are 
established and interested parties, including water users, environmental and social advocates, 
and the broader community, have the opportunity for effective engagement in the process 
(Camkin & Neto, 2016). Both acts emphasized the role of local communities in influencing how 
water resources are managed and how water services are rendered by emphasizing on inclusivity 
and public consultations in key decisions affecting local communities and users by requiring the 
Cabinet Secretary to involve the public. The quality, relevance and effectiveness of government 
policies depend on ensuring wide participation which is likely to create more confidence in the 
institutions that deliver policies (Rodgers & Hall, 2003). The setting up of structures like the 
user associations and action groups further provide the mechanisms necessary for involving 
them. This ensures that the constitutional requirement of participation is observed as well as 
caters for the concerns and contributions of the individuals who receive water services. This is 
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supported by Teodosiu, Barjoveanu, and Vinke-de Kruijf (2013) who state that it is widely 
supported that the implementation of Integrated Water Resource Management requires a 
participatory approach meaning that water management authorities should involve relevant 
stakeholders such as representatives in planning, decision-making and implementation, instead 
of adopting a top-down approach.  
 
b. Water Resources Management Authority (WARMA) and the Water Resources 
Authority 
Resource management is critical in water governance given its scarcity. The Acts cater for its 
management in terms of allocation, source protection and conservation, water quality 
management and pollution control. This is different from Mexico, Chile, Brazil, Spain, 
Morocco, South Africa, Sri Lanka, China, and India where water policies remained silent on the 
issue of water pollution, which has now come to the fore as a critical determinant to water quality 
and the right to access clean water (Saleth & Dinar, 2000). The Water Act, 2016 additionally 
includes flood mitigation. Flood mitigation is an important aspect of water resource 
management as it helps to make good use of the water as well as prevent any damages that 
emanate from flood water.  Environmental roles in resource management include water 
conservation, designating protected areas and ensuring Environmental Impact Assessments are 
done where necessary.  
 
The Water Act, 2016 further contemplates a level of interdependence between the Basin 
Committees and the Authority for purposes of management of water resources, including the 
Authority providing technical support to the Basin Committees. Similarly, in Romania water 
resources management has been organized at river basin level. There is a central water 
management authority, the Romanian Waters National Administration which is responsible for 
the management of the quality and the quantity of ground water and surface water and it operates 
through branches at the river basin level where there are River Basin Committees (Teodosiu, 
Barjoveanu, & Vinke-de Kruijf, 2013). 
 
The social roles catered for in the Acts include public consultation in the determination of 
applications for permits, prioritizing water for domestic use and providing human resource 
capacity for the organization. This is in line with the social aspect of water governance as 
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envisioned by Camkin and Neto (2016) who state that it incorporate participatory processes and 
decentralized decision making. Public consultation ensures that all aspects of the resource and 
concerns of all stakeholders are addressed in the process hence reducing cases of disputes. In 
Romania, public participation was used in dealing with water challenges like water quality 
(Teodosiu, Barjoveanu, & Vinke-de Kruijf, 2013).  
 
Prioritization of water for domestic use ensures that the human rights aspect is always addressed, 
and human survival is given priority over other commercial uses. Regulation is intended to 
provide a balance between social and commercial goals (Van den Berg & Danilenko, 2017). 
Political roles entail the maintenance of a national database and information system and 
coordination with relevant organizations. In addition, they serve an advisory role to the Cabinet 
Secretary on the management and use of water resources and matters of formulation of policy 
on national water resource management, water storage and flood control strategies as opposed 
to the Water Act, 2002 which assigned the formulation of the strategy to WARMA. This aids in 
creating different levels for policy formulation and regulation which is crucial in a governance 
system to ensure that there is no conflict of interest where the strategy is formulated by WRA 
and they are still tasked with implementing it. 
 
The Authority is tasked with coordinating with other regional, national and international bodies 
for the better regulation of the management and use of water resources. Water is a resource that 
cuts across boundaries and territories and its management therefore may fall in different 
jurisdictions that require collaboration so as to promote its efficient use and avoid conflict. 
Policies and actions must be coherent (Camkin & Neto, 2016). Coherence in these acts is 
envisioned by these coordination mechanisms with various bodies that relate to their mandate. 
The Authority is required to maintain a national monitoring and information system. This 
system creates a database of information that can be used for evidence-based decision making 
for the Authority as well as the Ministry of Water and Sanitation. A regulatory framework 
should have the regulator as a repository of knowledge and experience on water issues in the 
country (Mwanza, 2010). 
 
Economic roles include the funding provisions for the authority, charges imposed for water use 
and ensuring efficient use of water. The Authority is required to give permission through permits 
63 
 
for water use and abstraction. This in in line with Camkin and Neto (2016) who state that the 
economic aspect should cater for water access entitlements. This ensures that water use is 
controlled and therefore promotes efficiency in its use. The funds the Authority charges for the 
permit i.e. water permit fees and water use charges can be retained by the Authority to support 
its operations and administrative functions. The Water Act, 2016 provides specific scope for 
permits to include water use, water abstraction and water recharge as opposed to the Water act, 
2002 which just covered water use. This ensures that all aspects of the resource management 
are covered therefore minimizing gaps. “Essentially, there are three major items to be financed. 
First is water resource management, including water use (both withdrawal and wastewater 
disposal) through charges or fees, plus forfeiture for non-use of water use rights” (Jacobi, et al., 
2014).  
 
The environmental aspect mainly ensures the sustainable use of water. “Sufficient flow of water 
of appropriate quality is critical to maintaining ecosystem functions and services that build upon 
them” (UNDP-SIWI Water Governance Facility , 2016). The environmental aspect is catered 
for in both acts by regulating and controlling the use of water resources, setting quality 
objectives, setting minimum standards, prevention of pollution and maintenance of standards of 
public works all of which are assigned to the Water Resources Authority. The Water Act, 2016 
further provides that the Authority can institute criminal proceeding to any individual or entity 
that fails to adhere to required standards or procedures. The “rules of the game” need to be 
clearly spelled out, as should the consequences for violation of the rules, and have built-in 
arbitration enforcing mechanisms to ensure that satisfactory solutions can still be reached when 
seemingly irreconcilable conflicts arise among the stakeholders (Rodgers & Hall, 2003). 
 
c. Water Services Regulatory Board  
The Water Act, 2002 and the Water Act, 2016 both provide for a body for water and sewerage 
services regulation, WASREB. WASREB has social roles which include consumer protection, 
provision for a complaints’ mechanism and capacity provisions. A key role of the Board is 
consumer protection which it aims to achieve by; setting national standards for provision of 
services and asset development for WWDAs and WSPs; setting license conditions and issuing 
licences to WSPs; monitoring the performance of Water Service Providers to ensure they adhere 
to set standards; facilitating the formation of consumer groups and ensuring that customers have 
64 
 
a complaints mechanism. It also sets tariffs for water and sewerage services which is in line with 
Mwanza (2010) who stated that a regulatory framework should include approval of tariffs to 
ensure commercial viability of the service providers. 
 
Water is critical for survival and useful in many other aspects of society, if not properly 
managed, WSPs in an effort to realize profits may take advantage of users by charging exorbitant 
fees or delivering low quality. This is in line with what Mwanza (2010) stated that a regulatory 
framework should include protection of consumers against monopoly practices of service 
providers. It further supports the argument that African countries with formal regulatory 
agencies in place provide better customer protection and higher service quality (Van den Berg 
& Danilenko, 2017). The Water Act, 2016 further creates a system for continuously obtaining 
views from stakeholders through complaints mechanisms and consumer groups. As an 
accountability role they are expected to report annually to the public on issues of water supply 
and sewerage services and the performance of relevant sectors and publishing the reports in the 
Gazette. Decision makers in government, the private sector and civil society organizations are 
accountable to the public, as well as to institutional stakeholders. Each institution must explain 
and take responsibility for what it does. This accountability differs depending on the 
organization and whether the decision is internal or external to an organization (Rogers & Alan, 
2003). Accountability is a key principle of a good regulatory system accountability (David, 
Groom, Halpern, & O’Connor, 2007, Mwanza, 2010,Banerjee & Morella, 2011). WASREB is 
also expected to provide upon the payment of a prescribed fee, its annual report and information 
from its database. While this is a key measure to ensure accountability the payment of a fee may 
not be possible for every citizen and can be an impediment to the access of information and 
public participation. 
 
WASREB further has a role with regard to marginalized communities where they are expected 
to make recommendations on how to provide basic water services to marginalised areas and 
ensure that the right to water is realized. In order to ensure access to water and adhering to the 
human right imperative it is crucial to ensure that the entire population in Kenya has access to 





Political roles cover the maintenance of a database and coordination with other relevant 
institutions. As an accountability role they are expected to report annually to the public on issues 
of water supply and sewerage services and the performance of relevant sectors and publishing 
the reports in the Gazette. The Water Act, 2016 no longer assigns the role of coordination with 
other relevant institutions to WASREB. This leaves a gap in terms of liaising with other 
institutions that may be crucial in the delivery of its mandate. However, the Act provides for 
WASREB to work with the county governments in enforcing certain regulatory requirements 
including terms of service provision by the WSPs. In this regard, the regulatory board may 
consult the county government in imposing special regulatory regime on a licensee who 
contravenes requirements of license.  
 
The Board is further expected to maintain a national database and information system on water 
services. This database could be crucial in guiding decision making based on evidence and 
therefore guide policy and strategic changes where necessary. A regulatory framework should 
have the regulator as a repository of knowledge and experience of water issues in the country 
(Mwanza, 2010). 
 
Economic roles include promotion of efficiency, performance management, determining 
charges to be imposed, advising water service providers, determining licensing applications and 
enforcement of license conditions. These are embedded in various functions, for example, a key 
shift in the role of the Board is their direct licencing and monitoring of WSPs in the Water Act, 
2016 as opposed to licencing by Water Services Boards who then were responsible for WSPs in 
the Water Act, 2002. WASREB further has a financial role. They charge licence fees and can 
retain them to fund their operations. This ensures that the Board has funds for operations and 
funding its activities. This is in addition to funds allocated by the National Government in annual 
budgets. Camkin and Neto (2016) state that the economic aspect should cater for meeting the 
cost of a sustainable water future. “Essentially, there are three major items to be financed. 
…second, is water service provision through public works (infrastructures), via water tariffs” 
(Jacobi, et al., 2014). 
 
Environmental roles include the promotion of water conservation and demand management. 
This is achieved through the enforcement of license conditions and ensuring water works meet 
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the set standards. The Water Act, 2016 further creates some clarity in roles e.g. it prescribes the 
scope of WASREB’s monitoring of compliance with established standards for the design, 
construction, operation and maintenance of facilities for water services to WWDAs and WSPs 
as opposed to the Water Act, 2002 which was not specific on the institutions.  
 
d. Water Services Board (WSB) and Water Works Development Agency 
In the Water Act, 2002, the responsibility of providing water and sanitation services was vested 
in the WSBs in a specific geographic area of jurisdiction through the licencing Water Service 
Providers. The WSPs would pay annual license fees and lease fees for using infrastructure of 
the WSBs. As opposed to the WSBs, the WWDAs are responsible for development, 
maintenance and management of national public water works. Water works are critical in 
delivery of water services since it provides the infrastructure necessary for water and sewerage 
services. In addition, the WWDAs have the role of capacity building for County Governments 
and Water Service Providers. This ensures that their capacity to manage the water works is 
continuously improved. In both Acts, however, the WSB and the WWDA can provide water 
services in cases where a WSP has not been identified. This provides a mechanism for water 
provision to continue uninterrupted.  
 
The Water Act, 2016 empowers the Cabinet Secretary to establish one or more “water works 
development agencies and define geographical area of jurisdiction for each such agency”. It is 
worth noting that although the Cabinet Secretary is required to consult with stakeholders in 
development of criteria for establishment of the Water Works Development Agencies, it is the 
prerogative of the Cabinet Secretary.  
 
The Water Act, 2016 fails to provide clarity on how the role of “development, maintenance and 
management of national public water works” assigned to WWDAs complements the one 
assigned to the National Water Harvesting and Storage Authority of “Undertaking on behalf of 
the national government, the development, maintenance and management of national public 
water works for water resources storage and flood control”. This may create an overlap in the 
execution of their mandates.  
 
The WWDAs further seem to undermine the ability of county governments to establish cross 
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county waterworks or projects through joint committees or authorities established by the 
counties. Article 189 (2) of the Constitution empowers counties to establish joint committees or 
authority to implement projects that are cross county in nature.  
 
The agencies are further allowed to source for funding including loan arrangements, develop 
projects without the control of the counties and hand over the debt to the county governments 
for repayment. Where counties are not able to make the required payments, the law empowers 
the agencies to take over the operation of the water works. This approach assumes county 
governments lack agency to independently design, borrow and implement water works 
development.  
 
There are two key implications of WWDAs. First, is that water service provision, a 
constitutional function of the county governments, can be undertaken by the national 
government without consent or agreement of the county governments. Second, the agencies can 
become WSP within the territory of a county without approval or licensing by the county 
governments.  
 
e. Water Services Trust Fund and Water Sector Trust Fund 
This fund caters for underserved or marginalized communities. This is crucial in ensuring that 
the entire population of Kenya is catered for in terms of accessing water therefore ensuring 
equity. It recognizes that there are areas where water provision may be commercially non-viable 
hence unattractive for water service providers. The WSTF can be viewed to some extent as a 
creation of an additional body outside the constitutional mechanism to finance the counties. This 
clashes with the provisions of the Constitution which provide that financing of the county 
governments including for the water sector should happen though the instruments provided in 
the constitution, which are the annual allocation through regular budgets and through the 
equalization fund. 
 
f. Water Appeals Board and the Water Tribunal 
Dispute resolution has been catered for in both acts by the Water Appeals Board in the Water 
Act, 2002 and the Water Tribunal in the case of the Water Act, 2016. The roles of the Appeals 
68 
 
Board cut across the political, social, economic and environment roles since it determines 
matters that cut across these roles.  
 
The dispute resolution mechanism caters for all possible avenues where dispute may arise i.e. 
disputes “concerning water resources or water services” as well as those that arise from the 
various institutions i.e. WRA, WASREB and the Cabinet Secretary. The Tribunal also serves 
under the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) and not under the Ministry of Water and 
Sanitation like the Water Appeals Board in the Water Act, 2002. This aligns it with the national 
framework for handling legal disputes. 
 
Dispute resolution is critical in water resource and services management given that it involves 
multiple sectors and players as noted by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (2005) and there may be potential for conflict to arise. It also ensures that there is 
an overall body to mediate over disputes.   
 
g. National Water Harvesting and Storage Authority 
The Water Act, 2016 caters for water resource storage and flood control, a role conspicuously 
missing in the Water Act of 2002, but which was assigned to an institution that was not 
established by that Act, the National Water Conservation and Pipeline Corporation (NWCPC). 
NWCPC were tasked with the development of large-scale projects for harnessing water supply 
such as the construction of dams, flood control and water harvesting. The Authority serves a 
critical role given that water has to be stored somewhere before it is supplied to the various 
users.   
 
The NWHSA is tasked with policy formulation, a task ideally meant for the overall body in 
charge of water, in this case the Ministry of Water and Sanitation. This differs from the case of 
WRA and WASREB who have an advisory role to the CS to develop the necessary policies and 
strategies. NWHSA, however, has an advisory role to the CS in the formulation of the national 




Another crucial role that NWHSA undertakes and that is important in water management is 
undertaking water emergency interventions during drought. This means the Water Act, 2016 
caters for scenarios of water scarcity and puts in place a specific role for such cases. 
 
Water harvesting and storage, flood control and the provision for emergency interventions 
during drought are crucial aspects of management of water as they ensure that the resource is 
appropriately managed and in cases of water scarcity necessary measures are put in place to 
ensure water access. The provision for an entity specifically to cater for these roles under the 
Act is therefore a necessary measure to ensure that they are not omitted in the water resource 
management spectrum.  As discussed in section 5.1.1c there is a potential clash in roles between 
NWHSA and the WWDAs in terms of water works development.  
 
5.1.2 Gaps in Kenya’s Water Sector Institutional and Regulatory Framework 
The gaps identified included lack of proper regulation of some institutions, overlaps in roles and 
omission of key provisions for cross sector coordination.  
 
Regulation of all institutions is also required to ensure overall quality of water resource 
management and service provision. However, as presented in the findings, the Water Act, 2016 
has two regulatory institutions for water service provision and water resource management but 
the Act fails to articulate how they regulate the WWDAs and the NWHSA which are responsible 
for water works development. An omission in the regulation of any of the institutions therefore 
poses a challenge to the maintenance of the overall quality of the service.  
 
Overlapping roles between WWDAs and the NWHSA create potential for inefficiencies or poor 
execution of mandates since a role may be omitted thinking the other institution is taking care 
of it. While the role of NWHSA is specific to storage and harvesting, the role of WWDA is not 
specific and that may be taken to mean that WWDA can develop storage and harvesting works 
as well. This lack in clarity may lead to conflicts. A study conducted in Rwanda identified the 
lack of clarity of the roles and responsibilities of the various stakeholders as one of the key 
impediments to the development and management of water resources in a sustainable way 
(Aboniyo, Umulisa, Bizimana, Pascal, & Mourad, 2017). Perret (2002) also found that the South 
Africa National Water Act lacked clarity on the implementation of features on certain key issues.  
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Water governance requires an inclusive and coordinated approach (Camkin & Neto, 2016). 
However, with the exception of the Water Sector Trust Fund, the Water Act, 2016 fails to 
envision collaborations or liaising efforts between the institutions within the sector and those 
outside of it. This may create a scenario where each institution works independently hence 
impeding efficiency in the use of resources. This is in line with Migai (2007) who states that 
“the lack of clear provisions of how an institution will collaborate with another to achieve a 
common objective creates conflict in execution of mandates as stated.” It is also consistent with 
study findings from India that indicated inconsistent and incoherent policies between national 
and state governments. India has similar sector-specific water departments, with separate ones 
for drinking water, others for major versus minor irrigation or hydropower, and others for 
environmental monitoring making the implementation of a holistic policy difficult (Prabhu, 
2012). The limited coordination envisioned in the Water Act, 2016 is likely to impede the 
responsiveness of the water institutions and the sector at large in a timely manner to factors that 
include extensive collaborations e.g. issues to do with climate related effects like droughts or 
floods. This can be likened to a situation in Canada and Chile that found that limited institutional 
coordination and integration, a result of management rigidity, are challenges limiting the 
responsiveness of water governance in both Canada and Chile, especially at the local level 
(Hurlbert & Diaz, 2013). 
 
5.1.3 Challenges experienced in implementing the mandates in the regulatory framework  
Challenges identified include; funding, regulation challenges whereby County Governments 
feel that they should regulate certain functions in their areas of jurisdiction hence interfering 
with regulation of Water Service Providers, and coordination challenges.  
 
Funding shortages can impact on the achievement of an institutional mandate. As a result of the 
shortage the organization has to prioritize what it can do with what is available and this may 
mean total omission of some functions or less than optimal quality in delivery. Inadequate 
funding for water conservation measures leads to the gradual decline in quality and quantity of 
water from the sources (Ministry of Water and Irrigation, 2011). Similarly, Kithuku (2014) 
found that the lack of access to finance and the technical and managerial capacity to use finance 
effectively and the lack of clear guidelines for the provision and regulation of private sector 
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involvement in the financing and management of water supply and sewerage services influence 
water sector reforms in Tanathi Water Services Board. 
 
The regulatory challenges can result in conflict between institutions and its actors in the 
execution of mandates. It should be clearly understood by all the actors that regulation remains 
the function of the National Government and is being executed through the institutions created 
in the Water Act, 2016. These governance challenges can also be linked to the enforcement 
challenges identified whereby the counties interfere with the execution of the national 
institutions’ mandates. This may lead to a scenario where services are impeded due to a clash 
over who should perform the function. Moraa, Otieno, and Salim (2012) highlight the lack of 
unified framework for the management of water resources as a challenge faced by the Ministry 
of Water in achieving envisaged water reform targets.   
 
Coordination is a key aspect of policy implementation. The lack of it affects the execution of 
mandates and the achievement of objectives. Water cuts across several institutions, sectors and 
functions. While water management and service delivery is key, the ministries of environment, 
agriculture, energy and health all have a role to play in its management and use. A good 
coordination mechanism anchored in the regulatory framework is therefore vital to ensure the 
resource as well as service delivery is well managed. Poor coordination can result in wastage of 
water resources, poor quality of delivery and inefficient and ineffective management of water 
resources and service delivery. Lack of coordination of institutions was identified by De Loë 
and Patterson (2017) as a key shortcoming in water governance. The lack of coordination has 
also been linked to the setting of tariffs due to different levies being charges or imposed on 
WSPs by various institutions making the cost of water service provision higher. The main 
challenge in Africa does not lie in the water sector directly but instead the weakness of 
institutions and governance issues that lead to excess costs in the sector (Estache & Kouassi, 
2002). This can also point to policy fragmentation where different institutions under different 
acts all impose levies. This is similar to the United States of America and Australia where 





In conclusion, the study found that Kenya’s water sector institutional and regulatory framework 
presented in the Water Act, 2016, draws from the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 by catering for; 
decentralization, water as a human right and vesting water ownership in the state. It caters for 
water policy formulation, water resource management and water service provision. Its policy 
formulation rests with the Ministry of Water and Sanitation with the exception of the water 
harvesting policy which lies with the National Water Harvesting and Storage Authority.  
 
The Act provides institutional mechanisms for water resource management and service 
provision by creating specific institutions for regulation of water resources, regulation of water 
service provision, water works development, water harvesting and storage, financing of water 
services, catering for marginalized communities and dispute resolution. Under these institutions 
it also puts in place measures for consumer protection, dealing with water scarcity and flood 
control. The Water Act, 2016 further caters for participation, enforcement mechanisms, 
accountability and tariff setting which are among the principles of a good governance 
framework.   
 
Despite all this, the framework; has regulatory gaps, fails to envision critical collaborative 
mechanisms both within the sector and outside of it and has overlapping roles. It is further faced 
with implementation challenges that include funding shortages, regulatory enforcement 
challenges and challenges emanating from less than optimal coordination. The existence of gaps 
and challenges create opportunities for inefficiencies, impeded execution of mandates and 
duplication of roles which affect the general access of water by the Kenyan population.   
 
5.3 Recommendations 
Drawing from the findings and conclusions of the study, the following recommendations are 
made regarding the areas of review for the water institutional and regulatory framework: 
 
1. Coordination mechanisms 
There is need to clearly detail envisioned coordination mechanisms in the Water Act, 2016. This 
should include coordination or collaborations among the water institutions and specifically those 
established by the Act and institutions outside of the water sector but that play a crucial role in 
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the use of water resources. As part of the functions of each water institution, the Water Act 
should assign a role requiring them to collaborate and coordinate amongst themselves and with 
other relevant institutions in order to achieve their mandate.  
 
In addition the Water Resources Authority (WRA) should collaborate with the National 
Environmental Management Authority (NEMA), the Water Services Regulatory Board should 
collaborate with County Governments, the Water Works Development Agencies should 
collaborate with County governments and the National Water Harvesting and Storage Authority 
(NWHSA) should collaborate with NEMA.  
 
2. Clarity of roles 
The Water Act should clearly state the role of the Water Works Development Agencies with 
regard to the scope of national water works development as it has done for National Water 
Harvesting and Storage Authority to avoid potential clashes in the execution of mandates. In 
line with this the Act should further assign all policy formulation roles to the Ministry of Water 
and Sanitation and specifically in the case of the National Water Harvesting and Storage 
Authority which is assigned this role of developing a water harvesting policy.  
 
3. County Government Involvement  
The Act should establish a mechanism for County governments to participate in certain aspects 
of the work of the Water Works Development Agencies specifically in the role that involves 
obtaining of loans for water works development which counties are expected to pay after 
projects are handed over. This can be realized by having a member of the respective County 
Government being a member of the Board of the Water Works Development Agency.  
 
4. Regulation of water works 
The Water Works Development Agencies and the National Water Harvesting and Storage 
Authority should be regulated under the Water Services Regulatory Board hence creating a 




5.4 Limitations of the Study 
Limitations were encountered during the data collection phase. Accessing key informants was 
challenging given their field-based activities across the country and in the process the 
Coronavirus pandemic set in making various institutions close down non-essential services until 
such a time when it would be under control. However, through phone interviews and secondary 
data, sufficient data was gathered and analyzed to respond to the research questions. 
 
5.5 Areas for further research 
This study examined the water regulatory and institutional framework for the water sector from 
2002 to 2017, identified gaps in the regulatory framework, and the resulting challenges in 
execution of mandates. This study focused on national level institutions Future studies could 
focus on examining the institutional framework at the County level including County 
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Appendix IV: Informed Consent Form  
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION AND CONSENT FORM 
An Analysis of the Evolution of Kenya’s Water Sector Regulation from 2002 to 2017 
SECTION 1: INFORMATION SHEET  
Investigator:  Belinda Korir 
Institutional affiliation:  Strathmore University Business School (SUBS)  
SECTION 2: INFORMATION SHEET–THE STUDY  
2.1: Why is this study being carried out?  
The study is being carried out to analyse the policy and legislative changes that have taken place 
in the water sector from 2002 to 2017 in order to identify the evolution of the roles and 
responsibilities, challenges and gaps in the current legal and institutional framework and 
propose areas for review.  This sequential analysis is expected to highlight gaps in legislation 
and overlaps in management between various institutions as well as between the National and 
County governments. It further aims to inform the areas of improvement in policy and regulatory 
frameworks for effective management of the country’s water resources.  
2.2: Do I have to take part?  
No.  The decision to take part in the study is entirely optional and the decision rests only with 
you.  If you decide to take part, you will be asked to participate in an interview session aimed 
at obtaining information on water legislation in Kenya. If you wish to stop participating in the 
study after you begin, you can stop at any time by informing the interviewer.  
2.3: Who is eligible to take part in this study?  
The study will involve individuals in Water institutions who are or have been involved in the 
drafting and/or implementation of the selected documents for analysis and, therefore, have the 
ability to provide relevant information, ideas, and insights on the subject under investigation.  
2.4: Who is not eligible to take part in this study?   
 Individuals who are not involved in the drafting and/or implementation of the selected 
documents for analysis.  
2.5: What will taking part in this study involve for me?  
You will be approached and requested to take part in the study.  If you are satisfied that you 
fully understand the study and its goals, you will be asked to sign the informed consent form 
(this form) and then taken through an interview session which will take a period of 
approximately one hour.  
85 
 
2.6: Are there any risks or dangers in taking part in this study?  
There are no risks in taking part in this study. All the information you provide will be treated 
as confidential and will not be used in any way without your express permission.  
2.7: Are there any benefits of taking part in this study?  
The information will complement the current discourse on water reform and inform the areas 
of improvement in policy and regulatory frameworks for effective management of the country’s 
water resources.  
2.8: What will happen to me if I refuse to take part in this study?  
Participation in this study is entirely voluntary. In the event that you agree to take part in the 
study but later change your mind, you are free to withdraw at any time.    
2.9: Who will have access to my information during this research?  
All research interview records will be stored in securely locked cabinets and all your 
information will be kept confidential.   
2.10: Who can I contact in case I have further questions?  
You can contact me, Belinda Korir at the Strathmore Business School, or by e-mail 
belinda.korir@strathmore.edu or by phone +254706423216. You can also contact my 
supervisor, Prof. Ruth Kiraka, at the Strathmore Business School, Nairobi, or by e-mail at 
rkiraka@strathmore.edu or by phone +254 703 034220.  
If you want to ask someone independent anything about this research please contact:  
The Secretary–Strathmore University Institutional Ethics Review Board, P. O. BOX 59857, 
00200, Nairobi, email ethicsreview@strathmore.edu Tel number: +254 703 034 375   
I, ______________________________, have had the study explained to me. I have understood 
all that I have read and have had explained to me and had my questions answered satisfactorily. 
I understand that I can change my mind at any stage.   
Please tick the boxes that apply to you;  
Participation in the research study  
         I AGREE to take part in this research   
  
                   I DO NOT AGREE to take part in this research  
  
Participant’s Signature:  
_____________________________________  
Date: ______/_______/_________  





I, ________________________ (Name of person taking consent) certify that I have followed 
the SOP for this study and have explained the study information to the study participant named 
above, and that s/he has understood the nature and the purpose of the study and consents to the 
participation in the study. S/he has been given opportunity to ask questions which have been 
answered satisfactorily.   
  




  DD  /       MM  /     YEAR  
Investigator’s Name:   
_______________________________________  
Time: ______ /_______  






















Appendix V: Key Informant Interview Guide 
AN ANALYSIS OF KENYA’S WATER SECTOR INSTITUTIONAL AND 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FROM 2002-2017 
INTERVIEW CODE:       DATE:  
Name of Institution: 
Designation of the respondent: 
1. What led to the review or change of the Water Act, 2002?  
2. How have the roles of your institution evolved between 2002 and 2017? How? 
3. What gaps do you think exist in the Water Act, 2002 or the Water Act 2016 as pertains 
to the regulation of the water sector?  
4. In your opinion are the roles assigned in the Acts clear? Elaborate.  
5. What other statutory institutions does your institution collaborate with to deliver on your 
mandate? Briefly give the nature of the collaboration for each? 
6. Are there any gaps in terms of roles assigned to water institutions? Is there any role that 
has not been assigned to any of the institutions? 
7. In your opinion, do overlaps exist in the roles assigned to the various institutions?   
8. In your view, what has been the institutional impact of the changes?  
9. What challenges have you experienced in the implementation of the Water Act, 2002 













Appendix VI: Document Review Guide 
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